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Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to describe how the minimum biofuel re-
quirement affects the monopolistic oil markets. This is an increasingly
important questions, because the governments are smoothing the bio-
fuel’s way into the fuel markets for both the economical and environ-
mental reasons. The focus in this thesis is mainly on the minimum
biofuel requirement, but at times that policy is compared also to a
subsidizing policy.
To answer the research question of how the oil markets are affected
by the minimum biofuel requirement, the interaction between the oil,
fuel and biofuel markets was defined. From that the residual oil de-
mand was derived, which was applied into two different cost structures,
a static and a dynamic one. Solving these two cases both analytically
and numerically reveals their price and quantity paths for oil, fuel and
biofuel as well as the oil stock’s path. The final step of the analysis
was to derive how changing the minimum biofuel requirement affects
these paths.
The resulting contributions from this thesis are theoretical and
methodological. Numerical results are not given as no real, empir-
ical demands, supplies and costs were used. The first contribution
relates to defining the residual oil demand in case of the minimum bio-
fuel requirement and taking time aspect into account, which forces the
minimum biofuel requirement break at a certain production levels at a
certain time instant. The second contribution relates to handling the
production path when a monopolist faces a substitute, and that af-
fects the price and quantity paths. Solving these paths with the static
and the dynamic cost structures and analyzing the changing biofuel
requirements on them is the third contribution. The final contribution
of this thesis relates to presenting a subsidized biofuel case, and show-
ing that contrary to some results in literature, the biofuel subsidy does
not neccessarily postpone the oil exhaustion in linear demands.
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1 Introduction
The fuel market is under a change. Because of both the environmental and
the economical reasons governments for example in US and Europe have been
pushing biofuel to the market. The governments have greatly subsidized
the biofuel in order to make the oil substitute cheaper and to let it take
over part of the fuel demand. Using subsidies in US already 30% of the
fuel demand is served with biofuel. On the other hand, in Europe also a
mandatory minimum biofuel requirement has been applied. The European
Union Biofuels Directive from 2003 dictates that the nations have to require
20% of biofuel in transportation by year 2020. As biofuel has entered the
fuel market and it shall be pushed there even more strongly, the biofuel
is a relevant topic. I take my main focus on the European approach, the
minimum biofuel requirement.
The main research question is, how the minimum biofuel requirement
affects the oil market, and furthermore the environment. To answer this I will
set up a framework, in which I assume that the fuel and biofuel markets are
competitive, but the oil stock is owned by the monopolist. The monopolist
has market power as she freely decides the production quantities. However,
the minimum biofuel requirement affects the oil price and therefore also
monopolist’s optimum quantity path. As OPEC has at least some market
power, and as I consider the biofuel production and the fuel distribution
operating on more competitive markets, I claim that the presented framework
describes aspects of the current oil and fuel markets and carries therefore
relevancy with it. Using the framework I will derive various effects that
the minimum biofuel requirement causes. In that I try to keep most of the
mathematics in appendixes and dig into the economical issues in the main
text.
While reaching the deeps of the research question, I noticed problems
with the previous studies in entering substitutes. I describe some of that
already here in the introduction as it affected heavily my research path,
even if I have not described few of the concepts yet. To start with, Hoel
[1978] and Hoel [1983] described well the basic case of a perfect substitute
entering monopoly markets and taking over the market fully at some market
price. However, a substitute entering gradually into the markets and finally
taking over was not satisfactory described in the found references in the
biofuel field. A reference of Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010] for example
studies if and how the biofuel subsidies cause a Green Paradox1. They miss
the crucial fact that the price elasticity of the oil residual demand is not
continuous. Applying the Hotelling rule as a standard procedure leads their
price path to a wrong direction. The Hotelling rule is just piecewise correct,
1A Green Paradox relates to environmental policies meant to improve the state of the
environment, which actually worsen the situation. I will discuss them more later on.
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and as it turns out that the production path rests a considerable amount
of time at the discontinuity. Realization of some problems in the previous
studies caused me to be careful with my derivations and statements.
Throughout the thesis I assume full information. Hence, each party con-
sidered in the analysis knows the other’s best choice. There are the oil
monopolist, fuel distributors, the government, fuel consumers and biofuel
producers that know the game of each and every of the others. No question
asked that it would be interesting to widen the analysis to the direction of
less information and even to disinformation, but that I have to leave to the
future and keep this thesis compact.
I further assume a closed economy and a partial equilibrium. The whole
globe is naturally a closed economy, but the closed economy assumption
leaves few interesting questions like the distribution of wealth aside. How-
ever, I decided to concentrate on the biofuel requirement from the environ-
mentalist’s perspective and in that path the closed economy felt like the best
first step. Further, with the partial equilibrium assumption I mean that the
whole economy is at equilibrium at all times, but not as a result of this
framework.
Results of the thesis are derived using the above assumptions. The first
result is the framework for analyzing the minimum biofuel requirement and
especially the residual oil demand. I consider mainly the oil monopoly, but
the competitive case can be handled in a similar manner. The second result is
more general and relates to how the exhaustible resource monopolist handles
a substitute. I derived conditions for the time, how long the monopolist stays
in the quantity of a discontinuous marginal profit, as well as the effects on
the production path. Third, I solve the production and price paths for oil,
fuel and biofuel in cases of the static as well as the dynamic cost structures.
The solutions are given in analytical form, where possible and also evaluated
numerically for illustrations. Finally, as mentioned above I point out the
problems in the analysis of Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010] and present
a case where their analysis fails.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes background and
the most important concepts that are referred later in the analysis. Next in
chapter 3, I present the fuel, biofuel and oil markets and describe the concept
of the residual oil demand. In addition to the demand, the assumptions on
the cost structure affect heavily on the results. I took there two approaches.
First, in chapter 4 the costs are fixed and depend only on the production
quantity. That means that there are both low and high cost oil till the
exhaustion. Second, in chapter 5 the costs depend on the remaining oil
stock and the costs increase when the stock is produced. This reflects the
assumption that the low cost oil is produced first. Finally, in chapters 6 and 7
I give discussion on few remaining issues and draw conclusions, respectively.
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2 Background
2.1 Oil and transportation
Initially, the focus of this thesis was on fuel in transportation. I adopted my
argumentation mostly from the work of Kverndokk and Rosendahl [2010].
They give as the main reasoning for their concentration on the transporta-
tion sector that out of the produced oil the transportation consumes more
than half and the trend is increasing. Also, for most of the other energy con-
sumption needs there are clear substitutes that are available already in great
quantities, but in transportation sector any substitutes are not available in
quantities close to the current oil consumption. Further, Kverndokk and
Rosendahl [2010] claim that policy makers prefer policies that are targeted
to the transportation sectors; fuel taxes, minimum biofuel requirements and
emission standards for the vehicles. I considered the reasoning valid, but
do not want to press the argument to the point. Even if governments may
consider it easiest to apply the policies on the transportation, their main
target is to cut the total oil production. Therefore, in following text I will
not refer to transportation, but to the oil production and assume that that
can be considered in the similar manner as the transportation parts.
2.2 Fossil fuels, environment and exhaustible resources
The Earth’s atmosphere has a stock of carbon dioxide, CO2. Burning fossil
fuels, e.g. oil, affects the CO2 stock as that releases energy via oxidization
process. In that the carbon of the fuel reacts with the oxygen from the air
or from the fuel and forms CO2 as one of the end results. Therefore, using
fossil fuels does not only diminish their stock in the ground, but at the same
time the CO2 stock in the atmosphere increases. Sinn [2008] calls this the
double stock-adjustment problem. Affecting for example the oil price might
be in the ambitions of policy makers, just in order to increase consumers
welfare. If oil would not cause any harm to the environment and it would
be inexhaustible, the lower the price the better that would be. However, the
increasing stock of CO2 in atmosphere is a real problem increasing Earth’s
average temperature. Stern et al. [2006] call this as the greatest and widest-
ranging market failure ever seen. As releasing CO2 has been free, there
has been no incentive to take the pollution into account. Even if the total
cost of the increasing CO2 stock is unsure, affecting the atmosphere and
Earth’s living conditions are reasons, why governments have nationally and
internationally applied policies to decrease green house gases. Green house
gases are all gases in atmosphere that affect the Earth’s temperature, and
CO2 is one of them.
Which are then good environmental policies? Environmental policies
might affect supply or demand of the environmental unfriendly product,
or on the other hand on its environmental friendly substitute. The policy
3
might be a technical requirement, a tax, a subsidy or any form of a rule that
affects the environmentally unfriendly product usage. And it is not only
today’s usage that matters, but the whole production path. According to
Sinn [2008] flatter production paths should be favored. That makes sense as
that means that releasing of the harmful CO2 is more evenly distributed in
time. If that is enough for not reaching harmful levels of atmospheric CO2
is however not sure.
According to Sinn [2008] the fossil fuels are available at a given quantity
in the Earth’s crust as a gift of nature apart from the extraction costs. It is
great that nature has provided us a gift, is’t it. On contrast to the usual fear
of the oil exhaustion, Gerlagh [2011] points out that actually there is too
much oil available – oil is so cheap and its stock that great the atmosphere
may not be able to handle all CO2 from oil consumption. Even if the CO2
level decreases naturally in time due to its absorption to the Earth’s biomass
and oceans, Sinn [2008] argues that the decrease is very slow compared to
the pace of its current increase. Adjusting the fossil fuel usage in near terms
may be crucial to keep the atmospheric CO2 stock in tolerable balance.
In this there are many uncertain issues related, for example the acceptable
atmospheric CO2 level and how that affects the Earth’s average temperature,
but I leave those out of the scope in this context.
All fossil fuels are exhaustible resources. They are exhaustible as, cost
aside, they can be depleted till there is no left and new resources are not
created in any sensible time scale. And the exhaustible resources are of a
special kind. Their owner must think all the time the whole production
period till the exhaustion. The owner’s crucial question is the timing the
production. Producing a part of the resource today leaves less of her resource
for tomorrow. Hotelling [1931] gave the major contribution on exhaustible
resources. I go through some of his main arguments and results later on in
2.4, but there are also further development in the field since.
One development that is important to this analysis is the concept of the
Green Paradox. That is a fail in applying a policy, which is meant to be en-
vironmentally friendly. The concept was as such introduced by Sinn [2008].
I, however, use the definitions given by Gerlagh [2011], as he distinguishes
between the weak and strong Green Paradoxes. The weak Green Paradox
arises when the applied policy increases the current environmental damage.
In the context of this thesis that means that the current oil consumption
would increase as the damage here is just the CO2 absorption to the at-
mosphere. The strong Green Paradox is created by a policy that increases
the aggregate cumulative damages. Here I want to be quite careful. I will
explain later on that changing the minimum biofuel requirement does not
change the total amount of the oil stock that shall be produced over the
whole production period. Hence, in any case equal amount of CO2 is re-
leased to the atmosphere. However, the timing may change. One possibility
is then assume that all of the atmospheric CO2 remains there. In that case
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the measure of the cumulative damage would be the cumulatively consumed
stock of oil. There are two difficulties in this approach. The first one is that
CO2 is absorbed naturally to the biomass and oceans. In this study I can
not take a strong position if the absorption is remarkable or not compared
to the oil production time scale. The second one is that in some cases the
exhaustion does not occur, but the production lasts for ever. In those cases
comparing the cumulative effects is even more difficult, and the CO2 ab-
sorption from the atmosphere to the Earth’s crust occurs for sure at least at
some level.
The environmental aspect is not the main focus in this thesis even if
it is one of the main motivations. That aspect just arrives through the
assumption that the governments want to apply policies on the oil or fuel
consumption due to environmental reasons.
2.3 Subsidy or biofuel requirement
Rajagopal and Zilberman [2007] states that the main two methods especially
in US and Europe to boost biofuel usage have been subsidies and minimum
biofuel requirements. Subsidies to the biofuel are given often in a form of re-
ducing the fuel taxes for biofuels. They have been in use in US and in many
European countries. On the other hand, there are also efforts to control the
fuel contents directly. In the European Union Biofuels Directive from 2003
dictates that the nations have to require certain percentages of biofuel com-
pared to their fuel usage in transportation. This is a proportional minimum
biofuel requirement that is in the main focus in this thesis. There are also
other kinds of biofuel requirements, for example a basic quantity require-
ment, but I touch them only in few places in this study. Therefore, when
referring to the proportional biofuel requirement, I leave the proportional
usually out just to shorten the discussion.
There are no proper studies combining the minimum proportional biofuel
requirement and the dynamics of the oil monopolist. Grafton, Kompas, and
Long [2010] study subsidies and in that their results should relate to mine,
but there are crucial differences and also true problems. They study at which
conditions biofuel subsidies will create a Green Paradox. To start with the
merits of their framework, the residual oil demand approach is quite similar
to that I decided to choose. The dynamics of the residual demands are
naturally different due to different biofuel policies in our works, and I will
explain that in details in chapter 3.5. In their article, Grafton, Kompas, and
Long [2010] blame the biofuel subsidies and list two reasons. First, subsidies
are not first-best choice environmentally as a carbon (or generally green-
house-gas) tax or a cap-and-trade scheme should give a preferred result.
The tax would be the Pigouvian solution. Second, the subsidies increase
food prices. These are important issues, but I have to leave them aside.
The downside in the work of Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010] is that
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their approach to the monopoly or cartel case lacks one of the most crucial
ingredients; the discontinuous marginal revenue. The residual demand func-
tional form is not differentiable at the oil quantity when the substitute turns
competitive. The reason is that the residual demand has different deriva-
tives when arriving from greater or lesser quantity to the appropriate policy
limit. This causes a mandatory price limiting phase, during which the quan-
tity and price do not change. Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010] does not
handle this properly and that shadows their work throughout. That is also
a reason why I try to be very careful with the phase changing, when a policy
turns to binding or non-binding. In any case, the discontinuous revenue has
a real influence on price and quantity paths.
2.4 Hotelling’s heritage
The sole groundwork on the theory of nonrenewable resources was introduced
by Hotelling [1931]. Most of the analysis in this theses leans heavily on his
work (and to some additions later on by for example Krautkraemer [1998]).
Therefore, I consider it valuable to replicate here some of his thinking in
order to be able to reflect that to the current case. The starting point is
the resource monopolist’s optimization problem. She wants to maximize her
discounted profit over the whole production period.
Consider the maximization problem without substitutes. The profit of
the monopolist is the revenue minus the costs, where she may choose the
quantity as she pleases. The whole profit will not be available now, when
she defines the production quantities for the whole production period, but
she anticipates that they arrive for sure when the production occurs. That is
I do not include uncertainty in this respect into the analysis. Furthermore,
because there is a time difference between the decision phase and the receiv-
ing of the profit, I introduce the discounting factor into the maximization
function. I consider here only a constant rate of the required interest and
the exponential discounting. Hence, the problem is
max
x(t)
∫ T
0
(p (x)x− C (x)) e−rtdt. (1)
Here x (t) is the oil quantity path to be selected, p(x) its price at the given
quantity and C(x) are the quantity dependent costs. The production lasts
is T , and the discount factor is e−rt, where the discount interest rate is r.
I assume here that the profit does not depend on the stock of the oil, but
only on the quantity that is produced, and later on loosen this assumption.
To solve the optimum price and quantity paths let us turn to the calculus
of variation. Hence, the optimum quantity path must satisfy the Euler–
Lagrange equation. Let me use a notation f for the integrand, and write its
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Euler–Lagrange equation as
∂f
∂x
− d
dt
∂f
∂x˙
= 0. (2)
As function f does not depend explicitly on x’s first time derivative, the
second term in equation vanishes. Hence, the equation reduces to
∂f (x, t)
∂x
= 0. (3)
This simple condition states that the optimal path passes through optima
– the discounted marginal profit vanishes along the path. Note that f is a
function the quantity and time, and that each point on the optimum path
must satisfy this condition separately. Hence, to get the optimum path,
at each time instant the maximum of f in respect to the quantity has to
be solved. This simplifies the calculations. The path that connects these
optima is the optimum path. If there would be several maxima at some
time instants, the process of selection the optimal path should be considered
further as the quantity path might jump between maxima paths during its
course.
To help the calculations, consider of adding a constant to the original
maximization problem. Adding a constant does not affect the optimization
problem. I choose this constant here in a specific way. Namely, it is a
constant times the stock of the oil, which can be presented as a time integral
over the production period - even if I do not know the quantity path at
the moment! With this selection I nail down the final stock as I explicitly
claim that the whole oil stock shall be used till the last drop. In addition,
I choose to multiply the stock with a constant λ¯ is such a way that solving
the problem becomes easier. The procedure is formally
max
[∫ T
0
(p (x)x− C (x)) e−rtdt− λ¯S0
]
= max
[∫ T
0
(p (x)x− C (x)) e−rtdt− λ¯
∫ T
0
xdt
]
= max
∫ T
0
[
(p (x)x− C (x)) e−rt − λ¯x
]
dt (4)
Adding the constant could not affect the result. The last line is hence equally
valid maximization problem. This new problem also has to respect the Euler-
Lagrange equation. Applying that again from (3) gives
λ (x, t) e−rt = λ¯ (5)
This is one form of Hotelling’s rule. Here I marked unconventinally the
marginal profit as λ(x, t). Hence, the discounted marginal profit at a given
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time on the optimal path is constant as the Lagrange multiplier was defined
in this case as a constant. This discounted marginal profit at any time instant
on the optimal path is called also as the in situ value or profit. It is just
the difference of the marginal revenue and the marginal cost curves at the
optimum production quantity.
In case the costs are stock dependent similar analysis applies with few
new features. The multiplier, λ has to be time dependent and the added
constant of the form
∫ T
0 λ(t)xdt. Also that results the Hotelling’s rule. The
added integral is constant when the condition applies. I will continue on this
topic in chapter 5 and select there also a special cost function.
2.5 Static solution
Kverndokk and Rosendahl [2010] analyzed as one of their subjects the biofuel
requirement in static context. As in the static world time is irrelevant, they
do not face the problematic discontinuities met in continuous time. Even if
their work was as one of the starting points to my study, lacking the time
is a huge downside concerning the biofuel requirement. Because of that the
biofuel requirement they applied is not breakable. That is, they considered
only such levels of demands, at which the biofuel requirement is binding.
They did not consider the minimum biofuel requirement, but just the biofuel
requirement. Contrary, I decided to take in this study also into account that
at some demand levels the minimum biofuel requirement in not binding.
2.6 Efficiency requirements and taxes
In order to focus the research question, I have not introduced even some very
obvious aspects of the oil market. One of these is the fact that some coun-
tries produce oil and some others do not. Reflecting this the governments
take different positions for example in fuel taxes and tariffs based on their
oil production, consumption and importation. Hochman, Rajagopal, and
Zilberman [2010] wrote a comprehensive study on these subjects of the case,
when biofuel was introduced to the markets dominated by a cartel of nations.
As nations may regulate their own taxation and in practice they also do that
based on their position on oil, Hochman, Rajagopal, and Zilberman [2010]
argue that the cartels in oil production should be considered be formed out
of nations rather than firms optimizing their profit. Recognizing the merits
of the approach, I considered that the path of taking open economy aspects
into consideration would widen the research too much, and left them out of
this thesis.
A further analysis in the an open market was presented by Hertel, Tyner,
and Birur [2010]. They analyze using a partial equilibrium model how espe-
cially US and EU biofuel mandates affect globally. Their model goes down
to detail of trading and using of land, but lacks again time aspect.
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3 Framework of demand and supply
In this chapter I will go through the ways and means I have modeled both
the oil and fuel industry and their operators. As biofuel is the main topic of
this thesis, it is added to the concept.
I assume that there is one closed economy, and hence there are no trading
between countries or any taxes related. Further, the operators that need to
be taken into account are consumers, fuel distributors, biofuel producers and
the single oil monopoly. I consider this as the minimum setting for modeling.
I shall go through all of these aspects in this chapter and finally reveal, how
the oil price is affected by these assumptions.
3.1 Definitions and assumptions of fuel, oil and biofuel
Let me start from the beginning, and define here the fuel related terms that
I will use.
• Fuel I will use fuel as term for the product that the consumers buy for
commuting. It may contain both oil and biofuel in any proportions.
• Oil Oil refers to every oil based fuel for simplicity. This is not techni-
cally accurate and does not reveal the chemical composition of the oil
based fuel, but simplifies discussion.
• Biofuel Biofuel is a liquid fuel of any renewable source that can be
mixed with oil. It may be e.g. sugar cane based ethanol or palm oil
based biodiesel or any other fuel as long as it is produced of renewable
resource. This means in practice that the biofuel is based on plants
harvested or animals’ biomass. Hence, as plants and animals get their
energy out of solar power, biofuel is solar energy reserved into them.
In order to follow the text I find it important to make the notation clear,
and therefore I will use following notation.
• x refers to fuel quantity.
• q refers to oil quantity.
• s refers to biofuel quantity.
• a is the minimum proportion of biofuel that has to be sold with oil.
Note that the proportion may be also higher, when the minimum bio-
fuel requirement is not binding, and s ≥ aq.
As the sold fuel consist purely out of oil and biofuel, and as I assume
that none of them can be stocked for more that a relatively short period, the
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sold fuel quantity is equal to the sum of the produced oil and biofuel at any
time instant, and (6) follows.
x (t) = q (t) + s (t) (6)
I stated earlier that there is a minimum biofuel requirement, but that is not
plugged in into (6). The reason is that the requirement sets the minimum.
Hence, there are some market conditions and some part of the production
path that the biofuel requirement holds as equality. Otherwise, the market
parties have found better to sell more biofuel than the minimum requirement.
I will come back to this time and again.
The nature of the biofuel and oil are different from the resource point of
view. The only stock that I assume is the unproduced, unrefined oil stock
in the ground. It is owned by the monopolist and the main question of
this thesis is how shall she take it into production. On the other hand, is
there a stock of biofuel? As said, I assume no greater produced biofuel stock
than needed for the logistics and related to timely differences in harvesting,
producing and consuming. But there is the land, in which the ingredient
plants for the biofuel grows. Is that related to stocks? Land can be organized
to produce material for biofuel. If the biofuel production is at a sustainable,
long-run level, the production may last forever. Hence, the biofuel stock
related even to the smallest piece of land is infinite even if there are some
sustainability, growth and production limits related to the particular piece
of land, as well as a cost curve. Further, if the long-run biofuel production
level increases either through adding more land or by increasing productivity,
the biofuel stock increases to a greater infinity. Such boost might arrive for
example through better fertilizers. Nevertheless, I consider discussing of
biofuel stock problematic, and as it does not add anything into the analysis,
I consider only the current production and its limits.
3.2 Overview of markets involved
This thesis leans to the results derived from a fuel market model. I shall
explain the stucture of this model throughout this chapter. The model de-
scribes how the oil, fuel and biofuel markets interact with each others mainly
in cases the government dictates a mandatory biofuel requirement. To help
gasping the model I give here first a short overview to the three different
markets that are involved and which are referred later on.
1. The fuel market provides fuel for the consumers. The market parties
are the consumers and the distributors, who exchange fuel to be used
in commuting. The fuel market is assumed to be competitive, because
there are both numerous consumers as well as distributors.
The consumers are price takers and they buy fuel till its price meets
their marginal utility. Of the aggregate marginal utilities of all con-
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sumers I assume a fuel demand, Dfuel (pfuel). In derivations I assume
a linear demand.
The distributors face a full price competition, and set the price at
the same price as they themselves buy the fuel ingredients. Fuel may
contain both oil and biofuel at various proportions. Therefore, the fuel
price is the weighted average of its ingredients’ prices.
2. The biofuel market provides biofuel to the fuel market. Market parties
are the fuel distributors and the biofuel producers. The biofuel market
is assumed also to be competitive as there are plenty of both distrib-
utors as well as biofuel producers. Also, each producers’ product is
assumed to be a substitute for the others’.
Distributors buy the required amount of biofuel from the markets,
and meet the aggregate supply curve, Sbio (pbio). The other party, the
biofuel producers face a demand of quantity s. As there are plenty of
producers and full competition, they are willing to sell that quantity
without extra profit.
It becomes later on inevident that the biofuel demand varies in time.
The reason for this is that the biofuel demand bases on the oil pro-
duction level that is dictated by the oil monopolist. I assume that the
biofuel producers are able and willing to fully cope with the demand.
This assumption is probably not valid in real life as sovereign nations
might want to protect their own production, and I discuss this later
on, but keep the assumption for simplicity.
3. The oil market provides oil to the fuel markets. Market parties are the
oil monopolist and the fuel distributors. The oil market is governed by
the oil monopolist, who may choose the oil production quantity and
hence, also the fuel and biofuel quantities if their proportions are fixed.
The monopolist maximizes her profit over time. That dictates her
quantity and price paths. At any time, she sells oil at such a price
poil (t) that fuel market just manages to clear. In this fuel market
clearing the mandatory biofuel requirement and higher price of the
biofuel has to be taken into account. Hence, monopolist must consider
all other parties - consumers, distributors and biofuel manufacturers -
when deciding the quantity and price paths.
Distributors are price takers. Furthermore, as the monopolist releases
the just quantity that sums up to fuel market clearing price and quan-
tity, she milks all the profit and leaves none to the distributors.
3.2.1 Markets visualized
Even if the interaction between the markets involved is very simple there
are few issues that need to be clarified. To make the points clearly, I will
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use figure 1 for representing the overall markets interaction. It has the fuel
demand Dfuel(pfuel) and biofuel supply Sbio(pbio) plotted. They are here
linear and their parameters selected only for the representation. However,
the following discussion applies also to any monotonically decreasing fuel
demand and increasing biofuel supply. Figure 1 shows also an oil price and
q, s, x
p
Dfuel(pfuel) Sbio(pbio)
s
q
x
s
pbio
pfuel
poil
q1
p
p1
Figure 1: The markets summarized; the demand for oil and the biofuel supply
quantity pair (poil, q¯) that clears all the markets. That results in that the
whole monopoly profit arrives to the monopolist and no excess profit to the
distributors or biofuel producers. At each oil price level there is one such
a quantity. These make up to the residual oil demand. I will discuss that
next, and define how that can be derived.
The monopolist knows that the distributors and biofuel suppliers face
competition and neither of them manages to gain excess profits. Therefore,
the biofuel supply remains even if the minimum biofuel requirement wears
off. The distributors mediate the biofuel price through to the consumers in
the proportion the sold fuel contains biofuel. If the fuel distributors need to
12
buy a biofuel aggregate an amount of s¯, the market price will settle to pbio
as shown in the figure 1.
The price of the biofuel is not necessarily the same as either the oil or the
fuel prices. The government has dictated the minimum biofuel requirement
just for the reason – to force biofuel to the market even if its price is higher
than the oil price. Currently no or only too small amount of biofuel would be
sold within fuel if no minimum requirement would be stated. To affect this,
to increase biofuel proportion and most of all to decrease oil consumption,
the government has given a minimum biofuel requirement. It is crucial to
understand for the following analysis that this minimum biofuel requirement
holds with any sold fuel quantity level, but it is not necessarily binding.
The fuel contains both oil and biofuel. I have marked in figure 1 random
quantities of oil, fuel and biofuel as q¯, x¯ and s¯. Even if these quantities are
random, they hold always q¯ + s¯ = x¯. That is they represent quantities that
could clear the markets. With the competition that means also that the
distributors aggregate profits vanish and
x¯pfuel − q¯poil − s¯pbio = 0. (7)
However that is not yet enough. The given minimum biofuel requirement
adds a twist. If that requirement is binding or not depends on the prices.
Hence, there are additional conditions depending on if the minimum biofuel
requirement is binding or not. I go next these two cases separately through.
1. The binding minimum biofuel requirement binds the oil and biofuel
prices together, but their price levels are not equal. The prices ar-
rive through (7), which can be solved using the binding condition in
quantities, q = as. That is
q ≥ q1 (8a)
s = aq (8b)
x = (1 + a)q (8c)
x¯pfuel = q¯poil + s¯pbio. (8d)
Here q1 marks the quantity level, when the minimum biofuel require-
ment breaks. At a higher production level than q1 the above equations
hold.
2. The non-binding minimum biofuel requirement ties all prices equal.
When there is no binding proportions, distributors would buy oil or
biofuel, whichever they get at the lowest price. Distributors are indif-
ferent between biofuel and oil in their equilibrium only if oil and biofuel
have equal price. This occurs when the prices are relatively high. That
is between the break-up price (p1) and the choke price (p¯), which are
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shown in figure 1. The conditions for non-binding biofuel requirement
are
q < q1 (9a)
x = q + s (9b)
p1 ≤ pfuel = poil = pbio ≤ p¯. (9c)
The breaking point of the minimum biofuel requirement occurs at a quantity
q1 and a price p1. There both of the conditions (8b) and (9c) hold. By using
these, q1 and p1 can be solved. The minimum biofuel requirement is binding
with prices that are lower than p1. The breaking point, or p1 and q1 are also
shown in figure 1.
The oil monopolist limits her oil production, but she realizes that at each
oil quantity level there are two or three market conditions that define the oil
price if markets are in partial equilibrium. If she one day wants to operate at
oil quantities, at which the minimum biofuel requirement is binding, selecting
an oil quantity dictates both biofuel and fuel quantities. To be able to sell
all produced fuel and to cover the expensive biofuel costs the distributors
have to take a specific price level, and these define the maximum price the
monopolist may take for the oil at that quantity level. This as the same
as the conditions in (8). On the other hand, if the monopolist wants to
operate at oil quantity levels at which the minimum biofuel requirement is
not binding, she competes directly with biofuel. The oil and biofuel prices
are therefore equal. Monopolist may select the produced oil quantity, but
that defines both the prices as biofuel producers are able to meet that. These
were the conditions in (9).
3.3 Fuel market and demand
The fuel market is in this context a market where the consumers buy fuel. In
real life the market realizes itself e.g. at gas stations. The market is in fact
geographically very distributed, but considered here as a market as I assume
that the full information and a dense enough distribution network exists. The
fuel market is considered as a very competitive market. Consumers can buy
fuel from any distributors’ gas station and fuel is distributed to the consumers
in relatively small amounts compared to the worldwide consumption.
There are order of few billions decision makers making the fuel buying
decision quite often, adding up as the fuel demand. Here, I take that the
consumers’ aggregated demand is known by all parties as full information is
assumed. This demand is not assumed to change over time.
On supply side there are many fuel distributors available, out of which
the consumers may choose. Even if there are naturally efforts to lock the
customers to certain distributors, I ignore these. In addition, the fuel dis-
tributors may have other interest to meet the customers. For example selling
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other profitable products might be the approach of some gas stations, and
this might affect the fuel pricing decisions. I ignore also this argument and
claim for the sake of the analysis that fuel market is fully competitive.
In order to make the framework manageable, I simplify further the fuel
market radically. First, I simplify fuel market by not going into different fuel
varieties like gasoline, petrol, etc. I settle to discuss all oil based liquid fuels
as one market, as I consider them as more or less substitutes in the long run.
In this I recognize possibility for difficulties if further, especially numerical
analysis shall follow, but leave that subject out of this thesis. Second, fuel
is assumed to be used in small portions. Hence, as consumers buy fuel often
and by small amounts they are not able to affect the current or future price.
Adding biofuel into the oil based fuel does not affect much the fuel char-
acteristics by Kverndokk and Rosendahl [2010]. As in the beginning of 2011
the E10 fuel variety became widely available in Finland, customers’ reactions
revealed that some of them do expect contrary. Regardless of all this, I as-
sume that the consumers do not care of the differences in fuel characteristics
when biofuel is added at any proportion.
A very simplified representation of the assumed fuel market is given in
figure 2a. I will next explain the fuel demand and supply in more details.
3.3.1 Fuel demand
It is important to realize that the consumers demand in this model for fuel,
not oil. I have borrowed this point of view from Kverndokk and Rosendahl
[2010], who argue that if consumers use fuel only for commuting they demand
for mileage with their vehicles.
I keep the fuel demand fixed in these studies. Hence, I have to assume
for example that any of the changes in any of the markets does not change
the fleet of vehicles. In real life for example in U.S. there are signs that the
high fuel prices are finally diminishing the demand for the oversized and high
consuming vehicles.
As the demand is for fuel, introducing biofuel does not directly affect the
fuel demand. The change in consumers’ behavior arrives however through
the fuel price. Consumers are not interested how much there is biofuel in
the fuel they buy, but they are very interested of its price. Introducing the
biofuel to the fuel market affects the consumers’ behavior and therefore the
utility only through the fuel pricing. Consumers buy more fuel till their
marginal utilities are equal to the fuel price.
Let me take consumers’ demand as an aggregated demand of all con-
sumers within the closed economy. This assumption reveals that there is
only one price as no countries are assumed, and the economy is not even di-
vided into the oil producing and the oil consuming parts of the World. This
is naturally a limited view of the World’s economics. It leaves questions for
example of wealth distribution effects aside, but the subject was considered
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too large to be included within this thesis.
There is a number of consumers. Their aggregate behavior is revealed
in theory by setting their needs into order in price wise. I do not let the
consumers affect the price. Hence, the consumers problem is presented in
(10).
max
x
(U (x)− px) (10)
x
p
Dfuel(p)
pfuel
(a) The fuel demand and supply
s
p
Sbio(p)
s
(b) The biofuel demand and supply
Figure 2: The fuel and biofuel markets
3.3.2 Fuel supply
Fuel distributors are in pressure. To see this let me consider, how their
operation is affected by others. As discussed earlier, I assume here that
there is a monopolist, who owns all oil based fuel. If the fuel sold to the
consumers is pure oil-based, the monopolist sets the prices and quantities
to maximize her profits, and the distributors mediate the price to the fuel
markets. It is the monopolist who takes all profit as she sells oil to the
distributor at the same price as she knows that the distributor has to sell it
forward in order to get all sold. And there is nothing more to sell, so there
is no reason why the price could be lower. (I ignore here all other services
and products that the distributor might offer to the customers as well as
I ignore the small marginal, the rent that the distributor must be able to
bill to run the business, which might be the actual business.) However, I
assume that distributors have incentive to sell as much fuel as she can and
price competition drives her into that. This is important assumption when
the constant proportion biofuel condition does not hold. If the distributor
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would not face the full competition, she had freedom to increase the fuel
price over the oil and biofuel prices by lowering the biofuel proportion.
The entering biofuel affects the distributors, as they have to sell a dif-
ferent product and operate also on biofuel market. To sell an amount of
fuel they have to buy certain quantities of biofuel and oil based fuel. Dis-
tributors do not themselves decide the fuel quantity even when biofuel is
available assuming that biofuel is more costly than oil. It is the monopolist
who decides all quantities by deciding the oil production quantity. Distribu-
tors just provide that to the market. Also the prices are just passed through
the distributors. The prices of the both fuel components, biofuel and oil are
non-negotiable and as fuel market is competitive, the fuel price goes down
to distributors’ zero profit level. Hence, the price that the distributors pay
for the fuel and mediate to the consumers is the weighted average of the
different fuel prices.
3.4 Biofuel market
The biofuel supply is quite different from the fuel supply. First, biofuel is not
a single product. Contrary, biofuel is produced through different procedures
out of different biomaterials. However, I smooth the analysis considering all
biofuels totally equal in all their characteristics. Second, unlike oil producing,
there are many biofuel producers and no one has ability to own the resources.
Hence, biofuel market is considered here as a competitive market. Figure 2b
shows a simplified presentation of that assuming a linear biofuel supply for
convenience.
The biofuel demand arises here solely from the fuel markets needs. The
minimum biofuel requirement states that the quantity of biofuel has to be
greater that a fixed proportion of the sold oil. I assume further that it is
the distributor, who buys the required biofuel, but that the oil monopolist
is aware of all prices and quantities. The biofuel is assumed to be available
in a stable market, which clears at all prices. The clearing price is assumed
here to be affected only by the biofuel demand, and the biofuel supply is
fixed. This is a heavily simplifying assumption for the sake of the analysis.
In the real life there are demands for biofuel, the needed biomaterial and the
land also elsewhere. Hence, the biofuel supply and demand in fact may be
volatile as they depend on plethora of factors, which are not analyzed in this
thesis.
3.5 Oil market
The monopolist dominates the oil market. She defines the quantities that are
sold on the market and, as usual, limits the quantity and receives monopoly
profit for that.
There are many uses for oil. The products and the by-products that
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are received in its refining process are numerous and almost all of them are
valuable. In this sense concentrating on oil’s contribution on the fuel seems
to be very limiting. And more so, when considering that many of these oil
products and by-products have various uses themselves and they may be
sold within different markets. However, when considering substitutes for the
liquid oil based fuel in commuting there seems to be not that many good
candidates. Biofuel is naturally one, but even that is hard or impossible to
produce in high quantities.
There are two major features that oil monopolist has to take into ac-
count throughout these analysis. First, there is the time horizon involved as
the monopolist owns that great stock of oil that it can not be or it is not
maximizing her profits to produce it all at once. She wants to maximize her
profits over the whole production period. Second, the introduction of biofuel
affects the demand she experiences. For this reason, I have to introduce the
residual demand for oil. I describe that next and come back to the timing
problem in next chapters.
3.5.1 Residual demand for oil
Next I will discuss the model for the oil demand and form the residual de-
mand for oil modifying the approach of Grafton et al. [2010]. Their case was
to study, how the biofuel subsidies affect on the length of the oil production.
However, note that the subsidizing policy influences the lowest demands of
oil. I will show later that this low demand will occur at the end of the pro-
duction. Contrary to that, the minimum biofuel requirements affects only
the highest demands – or at the beginning of the production. I discuss these
differences of the policies and also a bit of their combined effects later on.
The key into understanding the oil demand is to realize the fact that
when there is a biofuel requirement the fuel demand is fulfilled by oil and
biofuel
Doil (poil) = Dfuel (pfuel)−Dbio (pbio)
= Dfuel (pfuel)− Sbio (pbio) . (11)
Here the biofuel market clearing is assumed at price pbio, and Sbio is the
biofuel market supply that meets the demand. What is here to note, is that
the demand for the oil is derived from both the fuel demand and the biofuel
supply. It is the fuel demand that arrives through the customers demand,
and part of that is served by the biofuel supply. The rest is the residual oil
demand. Also notable is that the prices of oil, biofuel and fuel are not equal.
I will discuss that next.
Figure 3 represent the residual oil demands in four cases to clear the con-
cept. In 3a there is the residual oil demand with and without the minimum
biofuel requirement. The marginal revenue is introduced in subfigure 3b.
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a > 0 a = 0
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(a) The oil residual demand with (solid)
and without (dashed) a minimum biofuel
requirement.
p
pi1
pi2
q1
p
(b) The oil residual demand (solid) and
the marginal revenue(dashed) when a min-
imum biofuel requirement applies.
q
p
q1
q’1
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p’
(c) The oil residual demand without (solid)
and with a subsidy (dashed) when a mini-
mum biofuel requirement applies.
q
p
p
(d) The oil residual demand with a fixed
minimum biofuel quantity in addition to
the minimum proportional requirement.
Figure 3: The oil demand in changing biofuel requirements and in changing
subsidizing
Subfigure 3c shows the residual oil demand with and without a biofuel sub-
sidy. Finally, subfigure 3d represent the residual oil demand when there is a
fixed biofuel quantity requirement in addition to the minimum proportional
biofuel requirement.
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3.5.2 Price of oil
How does the monopolist set the oil price? When the biofuel is introduced,
the monopolist knows that her product, oil is only one ingredient of the final
product that is sold to the consumers. Hence, the oil price’s connection to
the consumers demand has loosened a bit.
Let me start from the related fuel market. The fuel price is the com-
petitive market solution. Hence, each of the distributors make their own
decisions of the proportions of fuel constitutes and gains zero profit by as-
sumption. This condition ties the oil price to the fuel market equilibrium.
If in this equilibrium the fuel distributor does not make profit, the revenue
she gains from the selling of fuel is equal to the costs of buying the oil and
biofuel,
xpfuel = qpoil + spbio. (12)
Using (11) and (12) the oil price and oil demand are
poil (q) =
x
q
pfuel (x)− s
q
pbio (s) (13a)
Doil (poil) = Dfuel
( q
x
poil +
s
x
pbio
)
− Sbio (pbio) . (13b)
As stated earlier, there is a minimum proportion of biofuel that has to be
sold with a quantity of oil. When the requirement is binding, the equations
reduce to
x = (1 + a)q (14a)
poil = (1 + a)pfuel − apbio, (14b)
where the functional forms of the prices are from the relevant inverse demand
and supplies. Selecting one of the quantities, the rest of them are given by
the first equation and the second equation states the oil price. On the other
hand, when the minimum biofuel requirement does not hold similar equations
read
x = q + s (15a)
poil = pbio. (15b)
Selecting a quantity of fuel or biofuel defines the other’s quantity by the
latter equation. It also states the oil price, and the first equation gives the
oil quantity.
3.5.3 Breaking the minimum biofuel requirement
The biofuel requirements may break off from the minimum when the oil
quantity drops. I shall show now how this occurs.
Hotelling [1931] showed in case of the exhaustible resource monopoly that
the price is increasing and the quantity is decreasing on the optimal path. If
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the biofuel quantity is fixed in proportion to the oil quantity, decreasing oil
quantity requires decreasing biofuel quantity. But the competitive biofuel
market sells the lesser amount of biofuel at a lower price. Hence, the price
of biofuel is decreasing in time.
If the increasing oil and the decreasing biofuel price meet at some fuel
demand, the fuel price is also equal to the oil and biofuel prices. And further,
that common price level is the last time instant at which the minimum biofuel
requirement binds. If it held further, the biofuel price would decrease under
the increasing oil price as both quantities would still decrease. As distributors
face price competition they would cut prices and buy more biofuel leading
to the breaking of the minimum biofuel requirement. This leads to price
equality in the all markets. The prices of fuel, biofuel and oil are the same,
when the biofuel requirement does not hold at minimum level.
After the minimum biofuel requirement breaks, the prices keep on in-
creasing. The reason lies in that the monopolist still has market power and
she wants to continue in the path of decreasing quantities. But as the sup-
ply of biofuel is increasing in price, the competitive fuel and biofuel markets
ensure that the biofuel quantity starts to increase after the break. The fuel
supply decreases in time with or without the break due to the monopolist’s
actions, and hence, the oil quantity decreases now at greater pace. The
proportion of biofuel in fuel market increases rapidly until it fills alone the
market at the choke price.
What happens to the monopolist market power? As discussed, the mo-
nopolist has total control of the market in the first phase. She selects the oil
quantities so that the distributors mix it with a fixed proportion of biofuel,
and just manage to sell it all with no profit at the fuel market. On the other
hand, after the break there is a substitute or competing product in the fuel
market, the biofuel. However, biofuel is sold at a competitive biofuel market,
and the biofuel producers cannot control its price. Therefore the oil monop-
olist manages to hold market power. She just takes into account that the
biofuel affects the fuel market in a different, but still in a predictable way.
She realizes also that at some price, namely at choke price, biofuel served all
fuel demand. However, there is a fuel demand range in which she still may
operate. Biofuel serves there an increasing proportion of the fuel demand,
but it may be a very appealing range if the monopolist costs are low with
small quantities.
What if there is dominant players also in other markets? Execution of
market power leads to limiting supply. In fuel market there may be tempo-
ral or local monopoly power, but I assume that the competition and gov-
ernment’s efforts in removing cohesion does not allow that grow into any
remarkable scale. On the other hand, in biofuel markets some oligopoly
with competitive fringe might be plausible. The efficient scale of the biofuel
production may be that great and require so large areas of land, production
units and logistics that some monopoly power might arise that affect the
21
biofuel market. In that case, there would be a game between the oil mo-
nopolist and the biofuel monopolist from the start. When a binding biofuel
requirement, the biofuel monopolist would not be able directly to affect the
fuel quantities, but through increasing biofuel price, which in turn affects the
optimal paths of the oil monopolist. After the requirements wears off, the
biofuel monopolist would face either a fierce game against the oil monopolist
or a collusion with her. A game against the biofuel monopolist would hurt
the oil monopolist’s profits, and hence she tries to prevent this by increasing
the oil production in first phase. This subject seems to me very interesting,
but within this thesis I do not go further in this, but assume competitive
biofuel market.
3.5.4 Change in requirements and subsidies
Governments have implement policies to boost the biofuel usage. I shall dis-
cuss here how two of them, the minimum biofuel requirement alone and the
biofuel subsidy under the minimum biofuel requirement, affect the residual
oil demand.
Implying a minimum biofuel requirement affects differently the low and
high demand phases of the oil production. To help gasping the effect see
figure 3a, which presents the case in linear demands. As the requirement
does not affect the prices directly in low demand where all prices are equal,
the demand remains unchanged as in (15). In high oil demand, the biofuel
demand is proportional to the oil quantity. At a fixed fuel price the fuel
demand remains, but the proportion of biofuel increases. Hence, the price
of biofuel increases. To keep the fuel market in balance the oil price must
decrease. Therefore, the oil demand moves. As both price and quantity
decrease, the demand moves down and left. In the special case given in
figure 3a, the slope of the demand steepens. This is not yet the whole
story. The breaking point changes also. An increased minimum biofuel
requirement induces a smaller fuel demand at the breaking point, and a
smaller oil quantity. Continuity of the demand requires that the breaking
point is on the unchanged low demand curve.
How does the increase in the biofuel requirement affect the monopolist?
As we saw, the requirement increase influences only the high demand. It
decreases the demand starting from the new breaking point. From the mo-
nopolist point of view this can not be good, as her profit can not in any
case increase. If she operates before and after the requirement change in the
unchanged residual demand range, the profits are unchanged. In all other
cases she will lose. What about timing then? The decreased demand curve
does not encourage her to sell her oil at least in a quicker pace, but the
contrary. I shall go into details of this shortly, but for that I have to make
assumptions of the cost function.
As decision makers have various views and as the policies do affect dif-
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ferently, using multiple environmental policies at the same time might serve
best in cases. Let me discuss the effects of adding a subsidy when already
a minimum biofuel requirement applies. For simplicity, I go through only
the case of ad valorem subsidies - giving a certain sum of money for each
biofuel produced. According to Rajagopal and Zilberman [2007] this applies
for example in U.S. and in countries in Europe. Now, in low demand the
only thing changing by the subsidy in the biofuel supply. It increases as
the government is paying part of total biofuel price. The low demand of oil
decreases by the amount of the subsidy as shown for the linear demands in
figure 3c. In high demand, at a fuel demand level in the subsidized world
the biofuel is cheaper and oil more expensive than in the unsubsidized world.
This is because consumers are willing to pay the same price for fuel in both
cases, but the biofuel producers in competitive biofuel market are willing to
sell for less as government pays as a subsidy part of the price. Hence, the
subsidy flows through to the oil price and the oil price increase. Increasing
subsidies without increasing biofuel requirements would increase oil demand
in high demand and lower it in low. That would not be an environmental
friendly solution.
3.5.5 Competitive oil market
What if also the oil market would be competitive? Even if this is not in the
main scope of this thesis, it is a natural case to compare the monopolist’s
behavior with. The difference between the competitive and the monopolist
behavior is that the monopolist holds back the production knowing that she
can affect the prices. On the other hand, the competitive producers will sell
at the given price.
I continue in assuming that the demands and supplies are given. In a
similar manner as in the monopolist case that results in the same residual oil
demand. That was not dependent on the monopoly power. Now, it is worth
noting that the residual demand is continuous. That is the competitors
in oil production choose the quantity paths knowing that all possible small
decreases in production do not cause discrete jumps in prices. Therefore, the
entering of the biofuel into the fuel markets marks just the demand change
or more competition. The competitive oil producers follow the smooth price
curve according to Hotelling [1931]. Hence the competitive producers do not
have to wait to equalize the present values of the profits as will be the case
for the monopolist and will be discussed in details later on.
The biofuel requirement changes however the demand curve also in the
competitive case. If the requirement is given the competitive oil producers’
quantity and price paths are straightforward to evaluate. The price path of
competitive oil producers is given by the appropriate Hotelling rule. The
final price is the price at the backstop. At any time instant before that the
price is given by the rule. The appropriate quantity can be checked from
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the residual oil demand curve. That is after evaluating the appropriate price
level of the date (on the y-axis), the quantity is on the x-axis. I will show
next that this is not that simple for the monopolist, as she experiences a
discontinuity in the marginal revenue, an important factor in her decision
making.
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4 Static cost structure
Having gone through explaining the framework in the previous chapter I shall
now show what that implies. What have still missed from the framework are
the costs. Therefore, first in this chapter I will go through the fixed or static
cost model. Thereafter, in the next chapter I turn to a case of dynamic costs,
namely to one that depends on the stock of remaining oil.
In the case of static costs the oil monopolist experiences the same marginal
cost function throughout the whole production period. At any time instant,
she has the same decision to make: how much to produce today? Does she
then choose the same production quantities and get the same price at every
time instant? No, she does not. Thanks to the work by Hotelling [1931], we
understand that she wants an increasing marginal profit. Let me start with
the maximization problem, where all is about the monopolist choosing the
quantities of oil.
To make the calculation simpler let me modify the residual demand.
Evaluations are easier to follow, when the marginal cost is zero by defin-
ing prices differently. (In appendixes, where the derivations are given, this
presentation is turned back to the original one when necessary.) Nothing
changes in the case but notation. In short, the profit in the maximization
problem is unchanged, and with old (left) and new notation (right) it is∫ T
0
[qP (q)− C (q)] e−rtdt =
∫ T
0
[
qP † (q)
]
e−rtdt. (16)
Here P (q) is the inverse demand function and C (g) the costs. When the
inverse demand incorporates also the costs I call it as the modified inverse
demand function, P † (q). In literature this form of notation is called some-
times net pricing. Now, qP † (q) gives directly the net priced revenue or the
profit at the production level q, and its marginal profit is pi† = ∂qP
†(q)
∂q . This
notation is used in following to simplify presentations and calculations. The
value of the discounted profit with the new modified inverse demand func-
tion is just the same as before the modification, the levels and slopes of the
resulting curves are just different.
4.1 Very expensive biofuel - no backstop
I start with the simplest case, where biofuel is very expensive. Let biofuel
be so expensive that the fuel distributors would not add biofuel into the fuel
they sell without a mandatory requirement at any given, reachable oil price
level. The demand for fuel would stop if no oil would be available. The only
reason for adding biofuel to the fuel is because the government had made it
mandatory; no one may sell fuel without selling a given proportion of biofuel.
As distributors will never sell more than the mandatory proportion of biofuel
and as the government does not let anyone sell less, the governmental ruling
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of the minimum biofuel requirement is binding. Biofuel is sold at the same
proportion starting from the day one till the exhaustion of the oil. No biofuel
or nothing is sold afterwards. It is typical to say that there is no backstop as
no substitute is stopping the oil consumption even if the biofuel regulation
is limiting it a bit, as I will show in few moments.
4.1.1 Dividing production over time
With the given assumptions the monopolist has quite the same problem as
Hotelling solved in his days. The problem is to find the quantity path that
maximizes monopolist’s discounted profits. Contrary to the case of Hotelling
[1931], the price is here determined from the competitive conditions in the
fuel markets. And especially the biofuel regulations affect the solution.
There are few details that needs to be clarified. How does the time
affect the quantities or prices? Why does the monopolist not choose the
same quantity at each time instants if nothing changes? How long does the
production last? At which price and quantity levels to start with?
The first question to answer is how to handle the time. Time may be
handled using different methods. First, most optimization problems can
be solved by the calculus of variations. It hands out the Euler–Lagrange
equation of motion, which is a differential equation that is valid on the
optimal path. Second, it turns out that this case is solvable also using basic
Lagrange multiplier method. That is at each time instant optimization is
performed separately. The path is the trajectory combining these optima at
varying time instants. This was the method Hotelling used in his famous
paper in 1931. Third, in post-Hotelling era researchers tend to first write
down the Hotelling’s rule. In this case, writing down the current marginal
profit and forcing that equal to the one tomorrow discounted to today gives
the rule,
p˙i†
pi†
= r. (17)
As I use net pricing also the marginal profits are net priced.
The marginal profit is monopolist’s choice parameter at each time instant.
If the discounted marginal profit would differ at some time instant from the
others, at that time instant the quantity should be changed. The last drop
of oil on any day should not be produced if the marginal profit was less than
that of discounted from any other day, but saved. At the optimum path
none of the quantities should be changed at any time instant. That is when
the Hotelling’s rule applies. Finally, optimal control is a modern method
that can be spotted in research during last few decades. It is a more formal
method and bases on Hamiltonian mechanics.
The second question ’Why does the monopolist not choose the same
quantity at each time instants if nothing changes’ is wrong from the start.
The analysis of the first question already stated how the quantity must
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change over the time. But there is also something else in this as there is
something that changes in time, namely the stock. It is the remaining stock
that dictates the current production quantity. Let me clarify this a bit.
Producing something today lets you less for tomorrow. I state that even
stronger; there is no memory, but the stock. What decision the monopolist
did yesterday does not affect today’s decision, but through the smaller stock.
Keeping that in mind and starting from the end, what would monopolist do
if she had just one infinitesimal unit of oil? She will maximize her profit
and hence sell that at the price of just vanishing demand (I take here that
demand vanishes at some price.). Monopolist knows that that is the highest
marginal profit she can ever reach. If she reaches a situation where she has
that infinitesimal stock, she sells it at this profit. If she had a bit greater
stock, would she sell that at once if possible or divide it over time? From the
discussion of the first question we already know that the monopolist wants
to equalize the discounted marginal profits leading to a smooth quantity
path in our continuous case. Hence, the monopolist divides the production
over time even if she owns just a small stock. She also wants to cash the
highest marginal profit and to follow the increasing marginal profit as stated
by Hotelling’s rule. And quantity produced today is such that the marginal
profit at exhaustion is at its maximum and that the stock today is just ex-
hausted at the end. That is the optimum path. This answers also the rest of
questions, as they seem to be the same question. The price and quantities
on day one are determined so that the optimum path can be followed given
that the whole stock will be exhausted in the end.
What if the monopolist does not care about time? In other words let
me assume that the interest rate is zero. She does the basis school book
solution to maximize the profit today. She produces a quantity, at which the
marginal profit vanishes. I will call this solution as the zero-interest solution.
It is discussed and given in appendix A.
4.1.2 Solution
I shall go next through the solution for the static cost function case with
no backstop. Even if the previous discussion was independent of the forms
of the demands and supplies, in order to get concrete results I use in this
part linear forms, given and the evaluations done in appendix A. As the
derivations take lots of space and may distract from the actual matter I give
them in appendix C.
The quantity path and net price paths for the optimal solution are
q (t) = qˆ
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
(18a)
p (t) = pˆ+ (p¯− pˆ) e−r(T−t) (18b)
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Here qˆ and pˆ refer to the quantity and the net price in the static monopoly so-
lution, where no discounting occurs. I call this as the zero-interest monopoly
solution, see appendix A. p¯ is the exhaustion net price. The quantity path
is decreasing and the quantity vanishes at exhaustion as required. This so-
lution is familiar already from Hotellings work in 1931, as is the net price
path, which is increasing and end to the net price where the demand stops.
The relationship with the zero-interest solution is very close one.
Let me write down the initial and final values for quantities and net prices
q0 = qˆ
(
1− e−rT ) = r (qˆT − S0) < qˆ
qT = 0
p0 = pˆ+ (p¯− pˆ) e−rT
pT = p¯.
Here the final values are not that interesting as they were given into the
model by assumptions. But the initial quantity and net price reveal some
interesting information. First, the quantity is never greater than qˆ, the
optimal solution in the zero-interest case, at which quantity the net marginal
profit goes to zero (remembering that the cost function was modified to
zero). This is natural, but I underline here for the later analysis that there
is no reason for the quantity exceed the zero-interest solution of given linear
demand function. There is also a second piece of information. The further
the exhaustion time is, the closer the initial price and quantity are to the
zero-interest solution. For very far away exhaustion times their initial values
reach the zero-interest solution without a limit. This has an interesting
consequence I discuss next.
Any finite stock of can be exhausted optimally with any linear demand.
This is a results of the fact that the quantity limit reaches without limit
to the zero-interest solution. The form or parameters of the demand just
define the time till exhaustion. The exhaustion time is defined as the time
it takes to follow the optimal path given the initial stock. I have evaluated
its condition in appendix C.2. The condition is
1
r
(
1− e−rT ) = −S0
qˆ
+ T. (19)
Figure 4 presents the condition. Note that all the information of the demand
and costs is in the single factor, qˆ. There is no analytical solution for the
condition, but the exhaustion time can be evaluated numerically. And there
is always one and single solution.
4.1.3 Discussion
No backstop case is not a very good model to explain the fuel markets.
There are clearly biomaterial sources from which biofuel can be produced at
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Figure 4: The condition for the exhaution time in case of static costs and no
backstop.
reasonable prices. One example of these is the Brazilian ethanol production.
It is competitive in parts of the fuel market and hence can not be considered
as very expensive. Also, consider leftover oils or other biomass coming e.g.
from food industry. They are raw materials for biofuels. In order to get rid
of leftovers, and even get paid of it, the food industry should sell this raw
material. It is naturally a question at what prices they sell, but I leave that
aside.
4.2 Biofuel as backstop
Let me turn now to another case, in which the biofuel can serve the whole
fuel demand at some price level. This will occur after some finite time period
in this case. Thereafter the fuel market is fully competitive and biofuel serves
the whole fuel demand. Biofuel acts there as a backstop.
At this moment of changing to pure biofuel, oil exhausts. It exhausts
because the monopolist wants to sell all of her oil as it is profitable till the
last drop. And the biofuel producers are not pushing her out. They are small
in this framework and operate on a competitive biofuel market and hence,
they do not have any means for that. On the other hand, costs are neither
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Figure 5: The quantity and price paths in case of static costs with backstop.
driving her out, as the cost curve is fixed and the marginal profit is actually
increasing. The monopolist just realizes that she does not want to operate
on competitive fuel market, where she has no market power. Therefore, the
monopolist has willingly planned from the day one to exit the fuel market
at that day at that price by exhausting her oil stock.
4.2.1 Timing when discontinuous marginal profit
As there is now a backstop, the marginal demand the monopolist faces is
continuous but its derivative is not. That means that the marginal profit
is discontinuous. Does that affect somehow the case? Yes, it does a great
deal. Remembering Hotelling’s rule, the discounted marginal profit should
be equal at all times. And the rule is strong as we will see.
Due to the discontinuous marginal profit the oil production faces three
phases, which I shall discuss in detail shortly. To phase down the jump in
marginal profit the monopolist executes limit pricing for some time during
which she sells a constant quantity. Discontinuity causes need for a further
analysis also because the profits of the later phases have to be taken into
account as salvage values in prior decisions. That affects the results in those
prior phases’ decisions. Let me show how this goes. I note here three pro-
duction phases, where the final phase is the one where oil is exhausted, in
the second phase the price limiting is executed and the initial phase opens
the production.
To start with I write down the maximization problem of the profit ex-
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plicitly for the three phases of the demand,
Π = max
q(t)
[∫ t1
0
P †1 (q) qe
−rtdt+
∫ t2
t1
p†1q1e
−rtdt+
∫ T
t2
P †2 (q)qe
−rtdt
]
. (20)
Here, the first, second and third terms are the total profits from the respective
phases. The time instants t1, t2 and t3 refer to the ends of the initial, price
limiting and final phases. The profits of the last two phases are discounted to
the initial, decision time. I use here net pricing, and prior the discontinuity
P †1 (for quantities greater than q1 in the initial phase) and after that P
†
2 (for
q < q1). In the initial and in the price limiting phases the minimum biofuel
requirement is binding and in the final phase it is not.
4.2.2 Maximization problem and timing
As typical for such problems, let me start from the final phase. There is no
memory in the system, and the past path does not affect the decisions but
through current values. Hence, whenever reaching a definite set of conditions
the same optimum path shall be executed regardless of the history. And here
that means that when a certain oil stock is reached, the final phase begins.
When the final phase is entered, all the prices are equal as the requirement
is not binding. And at the exhaustion they all reach the same choke price.
At the same time the oil quantity vanishes and oil is exhausted. Going
further with the exhaustion argument there is some maximum stock, Smax3
that can be produced within the optimum path in the last phase. That
is the total stock produced on the path from the initial quantity of the
phase, q1 and price p
†
1, till exhaustion. If the original stock is no more than
Smax3 , the monopolist chooses to operate only in the final phase. That is the
minimum biofuel requirement is never binding. If the stock is greater than
Smax3 the final phase’s monetary value enters the monopolist decision in the
prior phases.
The monopolist takes the value of the last phase into account when choos-
ing her path in the first two phases. If the initial stock is not greater than
the sum of the maximal consumable stocks in the final and price limiting
phases, Smax2 +Smax3 , the initial phase is never executed. I continue however
here with the assumption that all phases are entered as limited cases can be
derived from the full solution.
The optimal paths in the initial and final phases must obey the Hotelling
rule. Therefore their marginal profits are increasing in time. The total
profit is now simple to calculate as there is no costs in the modified residual
inverse demand function. In addition, in the second phase the price limiting
strategy is followed. The profits for the initial, price limiting and final phases
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are noted as V1, V2 and V3, respectively and they are
V1 =
∫ t1
0
P †1 (q) qe
−rtdt
= −1
r
p†qe−rt
∣∣∣t1
0
+
1
r
∫ t1
0
∂P †1 q
∂q
dq
dt
e−rtdt
=
1
r
[
p†0q0 − p†1q1e−rt
?
1 + pi†1q1e
−rt?1 − pi†0q0
]
(21a)
V2 =
p†1q1
r
(
1− e−rt?2
)
(21b)
V3 =
q1
r
(
p†1 − pi†1
)
. (21c)
Here I note the lengths of the phases as t?1, t?2 and t?3. The used notation
for the marginal profits is; pi†1 is the net marginal profit when arriving the
discontinuity from above (in quantity), pi†2 when arriving below and pi
†
0 is the
initial net marginal profit. In solving the profits I have used the optimum
path as used there the Hotelling rule.
Now I am ready to tackle the case. To proceed let me write down the
total profit of the whole production,
Π = max
q(t)
[
V1 + V2e
−rt?1 + V3e−r(t
?
1+t
?
2)
]
=
q0
r
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
+ e−rt
?
1
q1
r
(
pi†1 − pi†2e−rt
?
2
)
. (22)
The last line results from plugging the profits in from (21a), (21b) and (21c).
In this case I do not yet want to use any heavier mathematical machinery
that is needed in the dynamic cost case, but use simple reasoning.
Assume now that the optimum path was solved for the problem. The
profit is given by (22). It has however a term that depends on the initial
period’s duration, e−rt?1 . Nevertheless, in the optimal path changing the
timing should cost in profits. Delaying costs due to e−rt?1 , but starting before
t?1 would not. Therefore, I claim that the second term, related to the timing
has to vanish at the optimal phase timing. Profit’s derivative in respect of
the initial period’s duration vanishes and reveals a condition for the price
limiting phase
∂Π
∂t?1
= 0 (23a)
pi†2 = pi
†
1e
rt?2 . (23b)
Here the discounted marginal profit follows the Hotelling rule also in the
price limiting phase, or at least over it. Hence, the whole production period
runs optimally when at each time period the discounted marginal profit is
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constant. If there is a discontinuity the production should wait till time
equalizes the marginal profits.
The total profit simplifies still. When taking into account the optimal
condition for the length of the price limiting phase (23b) and the total profit
(22), reduces to
Π =
q0
r
(p0 − pi0) . (24)
Even if there is a radical change in the rules of the game when the minimum
biofuel requirement wears off, and even if there is the price limiting phase, the
profit depends on the initial quantity, price and marginal profit in addition
to the interest rate. The first three of them can be evaluated by the Hotelling
rule of the discounted marginal profit.
4.2.3 Maximizing solution
Did I found the maximizing solution? Hotelling states in his article (1931)
that if the path found is the maximizing solution the forms
∂F
∂q
, F − q∂F
∂q
(25)
must be continuous. These are also called Weierstrass-Erdmann sufficiency
conditions. Neither of them is continuous in the present case, but with the
help of the price limiting phase. If price limiting is put there in between,
both of the Weierstrass-Erdmann conditions fulfill. Is there something wrong
here? No. There is no freedom in the final phase. The monopolist starts
executing the final phase from quantity of q1 regardless of history, when the
remaining stock is at certain level. Also the initial price and all final values
in that phase are given by the theory. There is nothing to manipulate in that
path unless changing exogenous parameters. It must be at discontinuity if
anywhere to make these conditions work. Further, the first form in (25)
states that the marginal profit should be continuous. As the marginal profit
at any quantity in the final phase is greater than the marginal profit in the
initial phase at any quantity, this continuity condition can never be satisfied,
but adding a phase in between. The price limiting phase helps to dilute the
difference of the marginal profits. The delay is just that long that it takes
for the initial discounted marginal profit of the final phase to reach the value
the initial phase ended. Their discounted marginal profits are equal.
4.2.4 Solution
The solution of the optimal path consists of the optimal paths in all three
phases. They are calculated in appendix D.1 with the Euler– Lagrange
equations and by cluing the solutions together with the initial and final
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Figure 6: The oil quantity path and the price paths for oil, fuel and biofuel
conditions. The quantity path in case of biofuel as the backstop in the
initial, price limiting and the final phases are, respectively,
q (t) = (q1 − qˆ1) e−r(T−t) + qˆ1 0 < t < t1 (26a)
q (t) = q1 t1 < t < t2 (26b)
q (t) = qˆ2
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
t2 < t < T. (26c)
The final quantity value in the initial phase shall be q1, and the gap between
q1 and the zero-interest solution qˆ1 is increasing exponentially in time. In
the later analysis for the existence of a Green Paradox I will need also the
initial value, and therefore write that down here
q0 = (q1 − qˆ1) e−rT + qˆ1. (27)
However, there is a condition for entering this initial phase altogether. If
the initial phase is executed depends on whether the zero-interest monopoly
solution is greater or smaller than the final quantity. If the initial quantity is
greater than than the quantity at the discontinuity of the marginal revenue
(or q1 > qˆ), the quantity path should be increasing. That is not optimal by
Hotelling [1931]. The marginal profit would be negative in that case. The
monopolist should in that case start directly from the price limiting phase.
Nevertheless, I assume that there is the initial phase and that the price
limiting phase follows just to smooth the discontinuity in marginal profits.
And in the final phase the total stock shall be exhausted.
In my opinion, even more interesting issue are the lengths of the phases.
As discussed already there are continuity requirements both for the stock,
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but also for the marginal profit. The lengths of the initial, price limiting and
final phases are, respectively
1
r
(
1− e−rt?1
)
= − S1
qˆ1 − q1 +
qˆ1
qˆ1 − q1 t
?
1 (28a)
t?2 =
1
r
ln
pi†2
pi†1
(28b)
t?3 =
1
r
ln
qˆ2
qˆ2 − q1 (28c)
The lengths of the initial and final phases depend on the quantity and stock
levels. These levels can be gathered from the continuous parts of the residual
demand related to the initial and final phases. Contrary, the price limiting
phase’s length depend on the discontinuity of the residual demand. That
was already discovered by Hoel [1983]. He got the same length of the price
limiting in the case of a perfect substitute and a full backstop.
TT
b − q1
r
− S0
b − q1
r
(1 − e−rT)
− S0 + bT
Figure 7: The exhaustion time when biofuel acts as a backstop
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4.2.5 No Green Paradox
Increasing the minimum biofuel requirement shortens the final and the price
limiting phases, but increases the length of the final phase. It does however
not cause a Green Paradox. I show this next.
The analysis of biofuel goes hand in hand with the analysis of the resid-
ual demand of oil. Let me remind results is 3.5.4 that increasing the biofuel
requirement lowers the quantity where the discontinuity of the marginal rev-
enue occurs and also lowers the demand at low oil prices. When there are
the fixed costs involved, these results do not change if the cost curve is
monotonically and smoothly increasing, or constant.
Increasing the biofuel requirement leaves the marginal profit unaffected
in the final phase, but changes its length. According to Hotelling’s rule
the paths do not change close to the exhaustion. This is because the final
marginal profit is unchanged and the Hotelling’s rule does not change. The
Hotelling’s rule dictates how the marginal profit changes in time, and nothing
changes there close the exhaustion. With the unchanged marginal profit, the
price and quantity paths do not change, either. But altogether the final phase
lasts for a shorter period as the marginal profit has not as much room to
increase.
The price limiting phase is shorter for the linear forms, because the re-
lation of the marginal profits, pi
†
2
pi†1
is decreases with an increasing biofuel
requirement. This results is derived in details in appendix B.2 for the linear
forms of demand and costs. That is
∂
∂a
pi2
pi1
∣∣∣
q1
< 0. (29)
Hence, by (28b) the length of the price limiting phase is shorter with the
increasing biofuel requirement. There is now a smaller gap in the marginal
profits and it takes a shorter time to equalize that. As the second, price
limiting phase is shorter, and the produced oil quantity q1 is lower with
increased biofuel requirement, also the stock produced in the second phase,
S2 decreases.
As both the second and final phases are shorter, and less oil is produced
during them, how does this affect the oil usage in general? To start with, the
proportion of the whole stock produced in the initial phase must increase.
This does not anyhow cause Green Paradox.
To analyze this in details, let me write down the stock produced in the
final phase in two ways
S1 = qˆt
?
1 +
1
r
(q1 − qˆ)
(
1− e−rt?1
)
(30a)
S1 = qˆt
?
1 +
1
r
(q1 − q0) . (30b)
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In the second equation I used the initial quantity relation, (27). Now, take
their partial derivative in respect of the minimum biofuel requirement
∂S1
∂a
= qˆ
∂t?1
∂a
+ t?1
∂qˆ
∂a
+ (q1 − qˆ) e−rt?1 ∂t
?
1
∂a
+
1
r
(
1− e−rt?1
) ∂ (q1 − qˆ)
∂a
(31a)
∂S1
∂a
= t?1
∂qˆ
∂a
+ qˆ
∂t?1
∂a
+
1
r
∂q1
∂a
− 1
r
∂q0
∂a
(31b)
Next I solve from the latter one the initial quantity’s change in respect of
the minimum biofuel requirement, ∂q0∂a . In that I need the initial phase’s
time change in changing requirement ∂t
?
1
∂a , which can be solved from the first
equation. Putting those together I gather that the initial quantity decreases
in the increasing biofuel requirement,
1
r
∂q0
∂a
=
∂S1
∂a − t?1 ∂qˆ∂a − 1r
(
1− e−rt?1) ∂(q1−qˆ)∂a
1 +
(
1− q1qˆ
)
e−rt?1
− ∂S1
∂a
+ t?1
∂qˆ
∂a
+
1
r
∂q1
∂a
< 0. (32)
Here ∂S1∂a > 0,
∂q1
∂a < 0 and
∂qˆ
∂a < 0. In the first term the denominator is
greater than one. Therefore its nominator’s terms are out powered by the
lasts three straight terms, but the partial derivative of qˆ. It turns out to be
negative and hence it does not need a balancing term.
The minimum biofuel requirement is a good environmental policy, at
least in case of fixed costs and linear supply and demand. It decreases the
current demand and decreases the initial quantity. The monopolist serves
the market for a longer time, but with smaller quantities, if a more strict
biofuel requirement applied.
4.3 Fixed minimum biofuel quantity
The basic solution just presented is problematic for the biofuel producers.
The biofuel quantity decreases in the initial production phase. Then it stays
put in the price limiting phase and finally increases in the final phase, till oil
exhausts. This is probably not a path that will occur as the regulator has
opportunity to affect the path in many ways. I will discuss next shortly one
additional feature that the regulator may use to protect the biofuel producers
from such a heavy volatility. She may set a minimum biofuel quantity. Such
a minimum biofuel quantity requirement is already in use in US according
to Rajagopal and Zilberman [2007].
4.3.1 Solution
I give here a solution only to the extreme case, in which the consumption of
the biofuel is initially above the long-run equilibrium. That is the relative
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low priced oil compensates the demand for the high priced biofuel that much
that its price rises above the choke price. This case is related to the case
just presented in chapter 4.2 if the oil quantities in the beginning are very
high. Now, assume that the minimum biofuel quantity is set to the long-run
equilibrium. The derivations for this case are given in appendix E.
Now there is only one phase as from the start the aim is at the choke
price. The quantity path is
q = qs
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
. (33)
In this the steady state quantity qs and the initial quantity q0 are
qs =
α− γ − 2βss
2β + σ
. (34a)
q0 = qs
(
1− e−rT ) . (34b)
There is just the equation for the exhaustion time to complete the case, and
that is
−S0
qs
+ T =
1
r
(
1− e−rT ) . (35)
Hence, if there is a minimum biofuel requirement as great as the long-run
biofuel equilibrium, the oil monopolist behaves like in case of no backstop.
I discuss that a bit more next and widen to the case of lower minimum
requirements.
4.3.2 Five phases
The oil monopolist faces the residual oil demand. This was discussed already
in chapter 3.5. In case there is both a minimum biofuel requirement (that
is a proportional requirement) and a fixed minimum quantity requirement.
Hence, the residual demand has two discontinuities. When a fixed minimum
quantity requirement is applied, the residual oil demand decreases at the
phase when the fixed minimum biofuel quantity requirement is binding, but
is unchanged in any other parts.
On the base of the previous analysis, there are now five phases. That
is because there are two discontinuities in the marginal profit and in those
the monopolist executes price limiting separately. Between them there is
the phase in which the quantity of biofuel is fixed and hence, the minimum
biofuel requirement breaks. In addition, there is the initial phase during
which the minimum biofuel requirement is binding and the final exhaustion
phase.
Also based on the previous results, the Hotelling rule is strong. It ap-
plies also over the discontinuities and it has to apply also to the middle
phase, when the biofuel quantity is fixed. I call this on purpose as a middle
phase to emphasize that the policy of the fixed quantity applies here in the
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middle of the demand. Contrary to that the minimum biofuel requirement
applied to high demand and the subsidies to the low demand. Remembering
that the production starts with high quantities and the a policy affects also
all quantity decisions before it is binding. Therefore, subsidies affect whole
production from the beginning till the end, but the proportional biofuel re-
quirement only the initial phase. The fixed biofuel quantity requirement
affects all but the final period. The fixed biofuel quantity requirement low-
ers the production quantities in the middle of the production, and increase
the length of that phase. This is resulting just by the Hotelling rule. In
the example solution given above, only the last phase was needed and the
minimum proportional biofuel requirement was not assumed to apply at any
time. Therefore, the solution was so simple.
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5 Dynamic cost structure
When utilizing a resource of any kind, some parts of it are easier available
than the others. The production cost varies based on which part of the
resource is currently produced. It is quite obvious that the monopolist would
not start from the hardest piece of her stock if others are easily available.
Nevertheless, it is not that clear that she would start from the easiest one
either. She could slice off from different parts of the resource to meet the
optimal production. This might lead to the case in the previous chapter, in
which the costs of production at any time is a fixed function. Now, I turn
to a different case, in which the stock is taken into use based on the costs.
When the least costly parts of the stock are produced first, the cost curve
that the monopolist faces depends on the stock. This is partly the case in
the oil market. The oil rush started from the easily accessed Texas and
currently oil is drilled already from deep seas and refined from the Canadian
and Venezuelan tar sands. In future, as the oil price rises even the hardest
reserves might come into production. But this is not the whole story as
in fact there are quite many oil producing countries and firms owning oil
resources of different qualities. There is no question about that the Saudi
oil is less costly than that pumped out of deep sees. And both are produced
currently. Nevertheless, I set that aside for the moment, and assume that the
oil monopolist owns all these oil resources and takes them into production
based on the costs.
5.1 Profit maximization and timing
I take in this part of the study a bit different route in the analysis than in the
previous one. More mathematics is needed and I mix the Euler–Lagrange,
the bounded optimal control and the Hotelling’s rule methods. Following
the derivations in the text is becoming more of a burden than helping in this
case, and therefore I give that in appendix F.
As nothing is changed in the demand side, the residual oil demand is the
same as previously. Based on the previous analysis, I assume that there is
again a price limiting phase between the initial and final phases. (However,
in appendix F.4.2 I show with the bounded optimal control theory that the
price limiting phase is mandatory.) Taking that into account, let me first
write down the total profit
Π = max
q(t)
∫ t1
0
(
P †i (q) + δS
)
qe−rtdt+
∫ t2
t1
(
p†1 + δS
)
q1e
−rtdt
+
∫ T
t2
(
P †f (q) + δS
)
qe−rtdt, (36)
where P †i , p
†
1 and P
†
f are the modified inverse demands for the initial, the
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price limiting and the final phases, respectively,
P †i (q) = b
i
1 − bi2q, t ≤ t1 (37a)
p†1 = p1 − γ − δS0, t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 (37b)
P †f (q) = b
f
1 − bf2q, t2 ≤ t (37c)
and the coefficient bi1 and bi2 for the initial phase and b
f
1 and b
f
2 for the final
phase are
bi1 = α (1 + a)− γ − aµ− δS0 (38a)
bi2 = β (1 + a)
2 + ηa2 (38b)
bf1 = p¯− γ − δS0 (38c)
bf2 =
p¯− p1
q1
(38d)
I have simplified the notation here by using net pricing. I continue noting the
marginal revenue by pi† and in addition note the marginal profit by λ†. Also,
there are now the stock (S) and a term that depends on that in the profit
functionals. At first it may seem cumbersome just to add the stock term
to the inverse demand. This is just for making the analysis more readable,
but some explanation is needed. First note also that the modified inverse
residual demand hides all terms that are constant or dependent just on the
quantity. Especially, it includes the initial stock S0 and its term is highly
negative. Second, when time passes, the stock gets shorter. Therefore, the
stock related term is a cost and that increases in time. See appendix F for
more details.
5.2 Solution
Let me again start from the end and work out the solution backwards. I
did this already in the previous chapter, but now the case is quite different.
The reason is that costs are now increasing in time. In the fixed cost case
the marginal costs were at their minimum, now in the current case they are
at their maximum at the exhaustion. Next, I will go through the solution
phase by phase starting from the last phase.
5.2.1 Final phase
In the final phase the stock exhausts, but it may exhaust in two ways. Either
it exhausts physically or economically. The physical exhaustion means that
the final stock vanishes as it is profitable to produce all of it. In following
this is noted as setting the final stock, ST to zero. The other option is that
at some positive level of the stock it is not more profitable to produce more
of it, and the final stock left to the ground is the stationary solution, Ss. In
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(a) The economical exhaustion
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(b) The physical exhaustion
Figure 8: A economical and a physical exhaustion when dynamic costs
this case, it is ST = Ss. Therefore, the production of oil stops when it is not
profitable anymore.
In the present case there is a given definite and finite stock. At least
some of that can be produced profitably. Hence, the initial stock defines
the form of the exhaustion. The stock dynamics over time are evaluated in
Appendix F.1. The solution is reached just by defining the maximization
problem, writing down its Euler – Lagrange equation and solving that with
the basic tools of differential equations (see Martio and Sarvas [1993] for
examples). Let me write down the result of that procedure, the generic
solution for the oil stock is
S (t) = C1e
w1t + C2e
w2t + Ss. (39)
To illustrate this result, figures 8a and 8b show the time paths of the oil stock
for the physical and economical exhaustions, respectively. The figures reveal
also further that the exhaustion time is infinite in case of the economical
exhaustion, and finite in case of the physical exhaustion. To understand
this further, I write down the solutions in more details and go through the
economical and physical exhaustions separately.
Both of the exhaustion cases have the same boundary conditions. At the
beginning of the final phase the produced oil quantity and the oil stock are
given q1 and S (t2), respectively. The final stock ST is also given, but it is
zero in case of a physical exhaustion and greater than zero in an economical
exhaustion case. The general conditions for the final phase’s solution are
derived in Appendix F.1 (see equations 115). I apply them here for the both
exhaustion cases separately to solve the coefficient for the stock and quantity
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paths.
1. Economical exhaustion Using the initial and final conditions the
coefficient for the oil quantity and stock paths reduce to
T =∞ (40a)
C1 = 0 (40b)
C2 = − q1
w2
. (40c)
From this the stock and quantity paths for the economical exhaustible
case are
S (t) = Ss +
q1
|w2|e
w2t (41a)
q (t) = q1e
w2t (41b)
2. Physical exhaustion In case of the physical exhaustion the coeffi-
cients for the generic solution do not reduce that much and they have
to be solved numerically from the conditions
−Ss
q1
=
erT
ew1T − ew2T
[
1
w1
− 1
w2
]
(42a)
C1 =
q1e
w2T
w1 (ew1T − ew2T ) (42b)
C2 = − q1e
w1T
w2 (ew1T − ew2T ) . (42c)
However, now the exhaustion time is finite.
5.2.2 Price limiting phase
The price limiting phase is still similar to the fixed cost case presented earlier.
If there is a discontinuity in the marginal profit, the monopolist stays put at
the fixed price p1 and fixed quantity q1 for some time t?2 and lets the time
fix the discontinuity. However, the present values of the marginal profits will
not be equal anymore over the price limiting phase in this case. And there
is an additional handle to take care of, namely the stock dependent costs.
In the price limiting phase the quantity is q1 and the price p1. There
is only the length of the phase that is unknown. I will use two methods to
tackle that, namely the direct evaluation and the bounded optimal control.
Let me first discuss how that can be directly evaluated. A more detailed
discussion and derivations are given in F.4.1. First, the marginal profits
in the beginning and at the end of the price limiting phase are equal to
the ones at the end of the initial and at the beginning of the final phase,
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respectively. If they were not the profit could be improved by modifying
the timing. Second, the stock is decreasing at a constant pace during the
price limiting phase because the quantify is fixed to q1. From that I get
the relation between the initial and final stocks binded by the length of the
phase. Now, the stock has to be continuous over the phases. The final stock
in the price limiting phase is equal to the one at the beginning of the final
phase which was defined by the optimality of the final phase. Hence, taking
these two facts together the initial stock in the price limiting phase is just a
function of its length and the given final stock. Finally, the dynamics of the
marginal profit is given by the optimality condition. That condition arrives
formally via the Hamiltonian. By solving that and plugging in the findings,
I reach the condition for the price limiting phase. This is done in F.4.1 in
details. As a result, the condition for the length of the price limiting phase
is
e−rt
?
2 =
pi1 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
)
pi2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) + δq1
pi2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) t?2. (43)
Here t2 refers to the time instant, when the price limiting phase ends, and
t?2 to the length of the phase. The length can be solved numerically in order
to solve all phases fully, and to plot price, quantity and stock paths.
Is there a price limiting phase? I will show next that there is always a
solution for the condition indicating that the price limiting phase exists. The
form of the condition is e−rt2 = k1+k2t2, where k1 and k2 are constant coef-
ficient. The exponential function is decreasing in the phase’s length, t?2 and
vanishing at infinity. Its initial value at zero time is 1. The right hand side
is not that obvious, and that is discussed in more details in Appendix F.4.
In result, it turns out that k1 > 1 and k2 < 0. Therefore, the curves drawn
of the left hand and right hand sides of the equation 43 cross each others
at exactly one length of the price limiting phase, t?2 and it is finite. I come
back to the subject again in discussing the effect of changing the minimum
biofuel requirement later on, and draw figure 10 of the case.
To get a different view, the price limiting phase can be thought with the
help of the bounded optimal control theory. Here, the monopolist controls
the production quantity. As seen in 5.2.1 there is the final phase that begins,
when the certain stock level has been reached, namely S(t2). This leaves the
rest of the stock to the previous phase. For that phase the monopolist has
defined initial stock, final stock and the final quantity. That is enough to
solve the general solution, which is similar to (39). However, there is a further
constraint; in the initial phase the minimum biofuel requirements holds and
therefore, the whole quantity path must be above the breakup quantity level,
q1. That is q ≥ q1 during the phase. Taking this into account there is always
a price limiting phase, during which the price and quantity are fixed at p1
and q1, respectively. Derivations with the bounded optimal control theory
are given in F.4.2. They result into the same condition for the length of the
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price limiting phase as the direct derivation in (43).
5.2.3 Initial phase
The first phase is more complex than it at first glance might seem. However,
when understanding that there is the price limiting phase, and solving the
final stock at the end of the initial phase with that, the generic solution gives
the solution for the initial phase.
The solution also in the first phase must fulfill the Euler – Lagrange
equation. Therefore, apart from the fact that the coefficients and the steady
state are different than in the final state, the form of the solution is the same
S (t) = C1e
w1t + C2e
w2t + Ss. (44)
Furthermore, the solution has natural boundary conditions;
1. The initial stock is given
S (t0) = S0 = C1 + C2 + Ss. (45)
2. The final stock can be evaluated from the last two phases
S (t1) = S1 = C1e
w1t1 + C2e
w2t1 + Ss. (46)
3. The final quantity is q1
q (t1) = q1 = −C1w1ew1t1 − C2w2ew2t1 . (47)
The boundary conditions and the form of the solution is everything that is
needed for the full solution.
Again, I discuss the solution also with the help of the bounded control
variable. The quantity is the monopolist’s control variable, and its path is
bounded below. This requirement arrives just because the residual demand
with the minimum biofuel requirement binding is valid only with greater
quantities than q1. If unbounded, the quantity path could be U-shaped –
first decreasing and then increasing. However, the final value of the phase
is q1, and that is the lowest quantity allowed for the first phase. The reason
that the shape of the unbounded solution arrived U-shaped lies in the form
of the solution in (44), remembering that |w1| > |w2|. Hence, as time goes by
the term with w1 weights more and more, and it pushes the quantity path
finally to increase. And if the quantity at some time instant would start
to increase, it would increase thereafter at all time instants. The bound in
quantity helps to find the optimal and monotonically decreasing quantity
path.
The solution to the bounded quantity case is presented in F.4.2. To
evaluate the time instant at which the quantity path reaches the bound q1,
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an additional transversality condition has to be taken into account. That
condition states that at the end of the initial period the average profit equals
the marginal profit plus required rent of the remaining production’s profits.
This condition helps in defining the unknown length of the initial phase when
assuming the quantity bound is binding at some values.
5.2.4 Stock, quantity and price paths
I turn now to discuss the resulting paths of quantities, prices and the oil
stock. As a base for that an illustration in one specific case is given in
figure 9. It has three subfigures; the first representing the quantity paths of
oil and biofuel, the second showing the price paths for oil, fuel and biofuel
and the third plotting the oil stock in time.
To be able to plot these figure I solved all given equations numerically
backwards by writing appropriate scripts in R. The solving process starts
from the final phase and its conditions. First solving the timing, and when
knowing the timing the coefficient. When timing and coefficient of the final
phase were known, that phase was solved, and I knew the stock at the end of
the price limiting phase. The process went through phase by phase revealing
the solution. Now, all figures share the time scale. The vertical, dotted lines
mark few important time instants, t1 and t2. They indicate the changes from
the initial phase to the price limiting phase and from the price limiting phase
to the final phase, respectively.
The quantity paths are shown in figure 9a. The oil quantity is plotted
with red and biofuel with green. In the initial phase both of the quantities
decrease till t1 and enter the price limiting phase. Finally, in the exhaus-
tion phase the minimum biofuel requirement is broken, and the oil quantity
decreases and the one of the biofuel increases rapidly. I have few notes on
this. First, having the price limiting phase means that the monopolist may
not execute the unbounded solution for the Euler – Lagrange equation in oil
production, but has to take the lower bound into account. The oil quan-
tity is therefore fixed staring from t1 till t2. Second, the quantity paths
are decreasing quickly in the first phase. Compared to the fixed cost case
the quantity paths have quite different shapes. This is however a matter of
chosen parameters. If the cost dynamics were very limited, almost similarly
shaped paths as in the fixed cost case would result. A limited cost dynamics
with a short initial oil stock causes the physical exhaustion. Finally, when
considering biofuel, again the biofuel quantity is tied to the oil quantity by
the minimum biofuel requirement till the end of second phase.
Figure 9b shows the oil, fuel and biofuel price paths. The choke price
(p¯) and the price limiting price (p1) are marked in it. As was in the fixed
cost case the biofuel price starts at a higher level and then decreases to
the price limiting price and the oil price level experiences simultaneously
an increase. If the fuel price path is increasing or decreasing in the first
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Figure 9: Paths of; the produced oil and biofuel quantities in (a); the oil,
fuel and biofuel prices in (b); and the remaining oil stock in (c) in case of
the economical exhaustion
phase depends especially on the minimum biofuel requirement, but also on
the other parameters. The effect of having a bounded solution is seen also
on the price paths as the price limiting price is reached at t1, when all the
prices meet. And again, as the quantity stayed put till the end of the price
limiting phase, so does the price. In the last phase the prices increases till
the choke price.
Finally, figure 9c represent the oil stock path. The stock levels at t1
and at t2 are given in the figure, as well as the stationary stock level Ss.
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As the absolute value of the oil stock’s time derivative is the value of the
oil quantity, the quantity path analysis should be combined to the stock
analysis. In the first phase the stock is originally S0. As the produced oil
quantity decreased over time, the oil stock path is first decreasing quickly, but
the pace is smoothing till it reaches t1. After that the stock path decreases
linearly till the end of the price limiting phase at t2. This is because the
produced oil quantity is constant, meaning that the stock path is linear.
In the last phase the stock decreases slowly as the given case was of the
economical exhaustion.
5.3 Hotelling rule
To complete the solution I will write down the Hotelling rules, when the sub-
stitute product enters gradually the monopolist’s market. The ’internalized’
Hotelling rule (the term used by Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010]) for the
monopolist applies at all times, and it is
λ˙ = rλ− ∂f
∂S
. (48)
I continue using λ, unconventionally, as the marginal profit. Let me derive
this a bit further. With the given cost function for the case, ∂f∂S = δq = −δS˙
and the rule reduces to one of the following,
p˙i
λ
= r (49a)
λ˙+ δq1
λ
= r. (49b)
The first rule relates to the continuous marginal profit, and the second to
the point of its discontinuity, the price limiting phase. In the first rule,
the marginal revenue’s change in time relates to the marginal profit by the
interest rate. However, note that the rule is not defined at the point of the
discontinuity of the marginal revenue, and there the second rule applies.
The final Hotelling rule for the current case, in which the residual demand
was linear in parts is one of the following,
q˙
λ
= − r
2di
(50a)
λ˙+ δq1
λ
= r. (50b)
The first rule refers again to the continuous marginal revenue parts. In that,
the relation of the oil production quantity’s change in time to the marginal
profit is a constant. That constant depends on the interest rate and the
slope of the appropriate residual demand, di. The rule for the price limiting
phase does not change.
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5.4 Effects of the biofuel requirement
The biofuel requirement affects the case of the stock dependent costs more
deeply than in the fixed costs case. I go through next phase by phase, how the
changing minimum biofuel requirement affects the oil monopolist’s decisions.
5.4.1 Final phase
The final phase is not itself affected if the minimum biofuel requirement is
changed, because its residual oil demand does not change. The form and
the roots (w1 and w2) of the solution are unaffected. The reason is that
the biofuel is competitive in the last phase and the minimum requirement
is not binding. Biofuel is sold at greater proportions than the minimum
requirement states.
Reaching the exhaustion is not either affected by the changing biofuel
requirements. For example the final stock is not changing. In case of the
economical exhaustion it is still the same condition ST = Ss that applies,
and the stationary solution of the last phase does not depend on the biofuel
requirement. On the other hand, in the case of the physical exhaustion, all
of the stock is still produced.
The initial condition of the final phase however changes. The discontinu-
ity of the residual demand arrives at a lower oil quantity when the minimum
biofuel requirement is increased as derived in B.1, ∂q1∂a < 0. As the form
and especially the roots (w1 and w2) are unaffected, the new price limiting
quantity with the increased biofuel requirement is on the optimal quantity
path of the old one. Therefore, the length of the final phase is shorter. The
initial stock of the final phase S(t2) is also lower and the stock produced in
the final phase is less than it was with a lower biofuel requirement.
5.4.2 Length of price limiting
The price limiting phase occurs just at the discontinuity of the marginal
revenue, and depends on its magnitude. The change of the minimum biofuel
requirement affects both the timing and the magnitude of the discontinuity.
The price limiting phase is longer if the minimum biofuel requirement
increases. To show this let me study how the price limiting phase’s length
was determined. It is determined by (43), and I rewrite it here
e−rt
?
2 =
pi†1 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
)
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) + δq1
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) t?2. (51)
On the left there is just the decreasing exponential function, which is unaf-
fected by any changes in biofuel. On the contrary, in the right hand side’s
linear function almost everything depends on the biofuel requirements. I
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Figure 10: The lengths of the price limiting phase in cases of various biofuel
requirement; in a3 the biofuel requirement is highest and no requirement is
implemented in a1.
rewrite the equation as e−rt?2 = k1 + k2t?2. The coefficient k1 increases in in-
creasing minimum biofuel requirement, but at the same time the coefficient
k2 is unaffected. See appendixes F.4 and F.7 for details. In total, as the
exponential curve stays put and the linear function moves upwards without
changing its slope, the curves coincidence later as shown in figure 10. The
price limiting phase becomes longer. It is to note for the later analysis that
k1 increases a certain, constant amount with a constant increase of biofuel
requirement.
The price limiting phase’s duration increases and the production quantity
decreases, but what about the produced stock. The produced stock in the
price limiting phase changes with increasing biofuel requirement as
1
q1
d
da
q1t
?
2 =
dt?2
da
+
t?2
q1
dq1
da
=
dt?2
da
− t
?
2
1 + a
. (52)
Here I have just used linear demands in the last line, and the definition for q1
(and set η = 0 and β = 1 for simplicity). This equation should be considered
as a difference equation rather than a continuous one as the changes in
the requirements are discrete jumps. Nevertheless, the equation serves as a
approximation. Now, the increase in the biofuel requirement increases k1 at
a constant pace. The price limiting phase’s duration increases quick for the
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small increases in the biofuel requirement, but the response stabilize in the
higher increases (see figure 10). The latter term is negative, and depends
on the initial duration, and it is a question, which of these terms effects
count more. The produced stock increases everywhere in increasing biofuel
requirement, if initially, at no requirement the first term is greater than the
latter. If the increase of the requirement were greater, the first term would
be greater and the latter smaller, resulting in favor of the increased stock
consumption in the price limiting phase. I gathered results of decreasing
stock in the numerical analysis, but only for small biofuel requirements. That
means that if the biofuel requirement is originally set to a very low standard,
the produced stock in the price limiting phase may decrease slightly. If the
standard is increased more, the produced stock however increases.
5.4.3 Initial phase
I start handling the initial phase from the Hotelling’s rule. As given earlier,
for this case it is
q˙
λ
= − r
2d
. (53)
There the slope of the residual demand steepens, when the biofuel require-
ment is implemented. Hence, at any given marginal profit level the dynamics
gets slower. The drive in the change of the production quantity slows down,
and the stock is produced slower. This was to be expected as the demand
was decreased. The production path becomes more flat, and according to
Sinn [2008] that was a sign of a good environmental policy.
The initial quantity decreases. Let me first take a look at the linear case.
In that the total profit in linear demands was evaluated in F.5, and it is
Π =
q0
r
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
. (54)
Increasing the biofuel requirement must not increase the present value of the
total profit, as otherwise the monopolist would start her own fuel distribution
network and apply herself a greater biofuel requirement. Therefore,
r
∂Π
∂a
=
∂q0
∂a
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
+ q0
∂(p†0 − pi†0)
∂a
=
∂q0
∂a
(
p†0 − pi†0 + q0d2
)
≤ 0. (55)
As in the last line the term in parenthesis is positive, the initial quantity must
not increase in increasing biofuel requirement. Here d2 > 0 is the slope of the
residual demand in the initial phase. In general, consider now the ending of
the price limiting phase with the increased biofuel requirement. After that
time instant the stock path is the same with the original requirement. Before
that the price limiting phase has just ended, and that was longer and at lower
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Figure 11: Effects of changing the biofuel requirement; on quantities in (a);
on price in (b); and on the remaining oil stock in (c)
quantity than with the original requirement. Also in the initial phase the
stock was produced slower, as the quantity dynamics was slower and that
ended at a lower quantity. Hence, with the increased biofuel requirement the
stock was produced at a lower quantity path, and the initial stock decreased.
The problematic part arrives in the stock behavior. I spent a considerable
amount of efforts in solving how the increase in the biofuel requirement affect
the oil stock. Having solved all the needed conditions, the influence should
be just a direct derivation. But the case has more in it.
The understanding of the stock behavior in the initial phase arrives
through the last two ones. In the final phase, a more strict requirement
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decreases the amount of stock produced quickly. And the greater the change
the less the additional effect. On the other hand, in the price limiting phase
the opposite is true. A small increase in the requirement may decrease the
produced stock during the phase. That turns around quickly, and the pro-
duced stock increases.
In total, an initially small biofuel requirement will increase the production
in the initial phase. This is because both of the later phases are producing
less. A stricker requirement will decrease the production less in the final,
but starts to increase that in the price limiting phase. The production in the
initial phase turns to decreasing when the second phase’s increasing effect be-
comes larger than that of decreasing in the final. The timing accommodates
respecting the given conditions.
The effects of increasing the biofuel requirement are shown in figure 11.
The changing quantity paths are given in subfigure 11a, the price paths in
11b and the oil stock in 11c. In all of these figures the dashed lines represent
the increased biofuel requirement.
The effect of increasing the biofuel requirement on the quantity paths
is shown subfigure 11a. The initial oil quantity has decreased and the bio-
fuel quantity increased. The initial phase last longer and the price limiting
quantity has decreased.
Subfigure 11b represents the influence of the increasing biofuel require-
ment on the oil price. The initial price as well as the price limiting price
increases with the increasing biofuel requirement. The final, choke price is
unchanged.
The oil stock path is shown in subfigure 11c. The biofuel requirement
is in this case environmental friendly. Even if the the same amount of oil is
produced with both levels of the biofuel requirement, the increased on results
in more conservative oil usage.
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6 Discussion
At this point, I have gone through how the minimum biofuel requirement
affects the fuel, oil and biofuel markets. Few related issues have been left
out, which rose under my studies as they had to be dealt with and which
bothered me for a quite long time. I will discuss these in this chapter. First,
I will go through how the biofuel subsidy affect monopolist. In that I have
opposite results than Grafton, Kompas, and Long [2010] gives. Second, I
will discuss shortly also on uncertainty. As the monopolist has a great value
in her oil resource asset, which she want to secure, short period quantity
path might be a result of coping to the changing expectations of the biofuel
policies.
6.1 Biofuel requirement and subsidy
The minimum biofuel requirement is one option for an environmental friendly
governmental policy. It is not however the only one. Is it better than a direct
subsidy to the biofuel producers? I go first through how the biofuel subsidy
affects the oil production.
6.1.1 Effects of subsidy
The biofuel subsidy was not in the main focus in this thesis. Nevertheless,
as it could be used instead of the minimum biofuel requirement or in addi-
tion to it, I want to discuss that also even if I am not giving the full path of
derivations. In subsidizing the biofuel production is supported and I consider
here just one case. In this case the government supports all biofuel produc-
tion by an equal amount of money per a produced quantity. Each gallon of
biofuel receives an equal subsidy. And further, the subsidy influences fully
and hence the market price of the biofuel decreases by the amount of the per
quantity subsidy.
Figure 12 presents the effects of the subsidy in one example of the dy-
namic costs case with linear demands and supplies. The dashed lines refer to
the subsidized case. In addition to the subsidy, there is no minimum biofuel
requirement present. Also, note that this case is physically exhausted. The
economically exhausted case would not be a fair comparison as when the
subsidy present the exhaustion occurs with a greater stock. In that case also
removing the subsidy path should be considered.
The quantity paths of the subsidized (dashed) and the non-subsidized
(solid) biofuel are shown in subfigure 12a. Increasing the subsidy decreases
the initial oil quantity at least in this case. (If this occurs in every case was
not studied as that was not in the main scope.) The initial phase is shorter
and the final phase starts earlier. The exhaustion occurs also earlier. In this
case there is clearly a sort of Green Paradox even if the quantity decreases
in the beginning.
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The oil price increases in the beginning, but flips below the original after
a while during the price limiting phase as subfigure 12b states. The initial
price is greater and backstop price lower in subsidized case than the one
without.
Subfigure 12c shows that the oil stock is depleted quicker in the subsidized
case than in the one without, but just in the beginning. Contrary, in the
economical exhaustion case the stock would exhaust at a greater stock when
subsidized. However, this has its price as the subsidy would have to be paid
forever if that level is wanted to hold. Therefore, this gain in the unproduced
oil stock should be thought as a temporary advantage. Subsidizing affects the
residual demand straightforwardly, as was shown in 3.5.4. The discontinuity
occurs at a greater quantity, but the slopes of the residual demand do not
change if no minimum biofuel requirement. Therefore, the solutions of the
initial and final phases do not change, but in their timing and end conditions.
The initial phase last for a shorter, the final phase for a longer time and the
price limiting phase arrives earlier and at a greater quantity than in the
unsubsidized case. In the given example, the price limiting phase also lasts
for a longer period, but that might not be the case always.
This description contradicts the one given by Grafton, Kompas, and Long
[2010]. They explicitly claim that increasing the subsidy will delay the ex-
haustion time in the linear demand and supply case with dynamic costs.
However, in their presentation the discontinuity of the marginal revenue is
not taken into account. That arrives in their presentation in the discontinu-
ity of the elasticity. One of their main claim is the condition for delaying the
exhaustion date, and it does not take the discontinuity – meaning the price
limiting phase – into account. Piecewise it applies still to the initial and final
phases, but does not have a meaning without the price limiting phase.
6.1.2 Is biofuel requirement better than subsidy?
The biofuel requirement has some advantages over the subsidy. It is cheap.
It acts on the present more than the future. It acts also in a way that
is easy to comprehend. However, there are some issues also. In the long
run operating with a subsidy on an economically exhausting oil stock leaves
some of that into the ground if biofuel subsidized forever. Also, with the
biofuel requirement biofuel production is in troubles. I shall discuss next
these subjects.
The costs of the minimum biofuel requirement are low. The government
does not have to pay more than the control of the requirement takes. On
the other hand subsidizing would require cash payments for a long time
and committing to that might be problematic for politicians. Looking this
from a different view, the biofuel requirement is not free at all. The costs
are paid in the oil or actually in the fuel prices. As the requirement forces
to buy expensive biofuel with the cheaper oil, the consumers pay for this
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Figure 12: Effects of subsidizing biofuel; on quantities in (a); on price in (b);
and on the remaining oil stock in (c)
environmental act.
The biofuel requirement is a policy of an immediate impact if markets
are ideal. Setting a requirement today affect already today as the oil produc-
tion drops immediately. The reason to this is that the biofuel requirement
decreases the demand for the lowest oil prices. Therefore, the greatest per-
centual drop in the oil production is today compared to the no-policy case.
To be a realistic, there is natural hinges in this. The biofuel production set a
limit for the biofuel requirement and also for the timing. Set that aside, and
assume competitive biofuel production, the biofuel requirement in a good
environmental policy for an immediate act.
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In the long run the effect of the minimum biofuel requirement wears off.
In the final phase, when the biofuel is a competitive substitute to oil, the
minimum biofuel has no effect on the quantities, prices or stock. Anyhow, it
had one on the timing. if something is left to the ground that is of an equal
amount than it would have been without the requirement. Would the biofuel
subsidy work better as its solution states that more oil is left unproduced
into the ground? That requires that the subsidies are paid forever in order
to keep the oil production non-profitable. In reality, the subsidy will finally
vanish. Knowing or anticipating this affects the monopolist’s action. The
decisions and paths in the exhaustion phase are therefore questionable when
using subsidies in the economically exhaustible case.
A biofuel requirement decreases the current oil production, increases
prices and causes the oil stock to last longer. That is easy to comprehend.
On the contrary, acting with a subsidy can cause a Green Paradox as was
seen in previous example in chapter 6.1.1.
The biofuel producers will be troubled by a new biofuel requirement.
They experience first a sudden increase in the demand of biofuel. Before
there is enough biofuel production capacity and producers are able to react
and meet the demand, it is far fetched to claim that the competitive biofuel
market exists. Nevertheless, I assume that the increased biofuel demand
meets the supply after some time. The demand turns to decreasing, because
it dictated to a certain proportion of the oil production, and the production
is decreasing. In this phase the biofuel producers are indeed competitive
as some of them run out of the business. There is a distress till the prices
of the biofuel and oil are equal. In conclusion, applying a minimum biofuel
requirement without carefully thinking of a backup production for the biofuel
producers is morally questionable policy.
The biofuel is subsidized at the moment and it is sold even in US, where
the fuel prices are cheaper than in EU. This reveals that the markets should
be in the price limiting phase already with the help of subsidizing. Further,
let me still consider just one big closed market, even in this that assumption
is clearly stretching the facts. If already in price limiting phase, the fore-
cast is that the quantities and prices stay the same for a quite long time.
Increasing the subsidy would send us deeper into the price limiting phase
or end it, decrease the price level and increase the current oil consumption
as more competition enters, and vice versa. On the other hand, increasing
the biofuel requirement would probably increase or delay the price limiting
phase, increase the oil price and decrease the quantity.
6.2 Critics on certainty
Having gone through the analysis with the fixed and known demand, it
is time to take a few steps back and see the pitfalls. World is changing,
whatever we might do to stop that. And in addition, if there is something
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uncertain at the moment, the level of uncertainness increases in time.
The uncertainty has dramatical effects on the framework. Remember
that solving the quantity and price paths started from the end, the ex-
haustion conditions and took bit by bit every detail into account till today.
Decisions of the whole production path were made on the first day. And
there was no uncertainty. Decide once, sit back and collect profits till the
exhaustion. On the contrary, uncertainty forces the monopolist to reconsider
the decisions during the production. It forces also her to take into account
the possibilities beforehand, and possibly execute actions or take different
paths already before the realization of the uncertain situation. The effects
of uncertainty given may be of any size even if the changes are quite small.
It is the monopolist who decides the paths. What does she know? The
most detailed knowledge she has on her own resources and the costs of pro-
duction. It is the outside world that causes more the problems. I discuss
two aspects, the demand and the governmental policy.
The monopolist knows the fuel demand at the moment. With the current
oil, biofuel and fuel prices she knows the sold quantities. She could also be
lured to assume that the state of the world has not been changing much from
yesterday, but a bit more from the day before. Hence, the monopolist has
at her hands today’s and last few day’s or year’s demands (with estimates
of how the world’s state has changed). She is also able to say something
about the demand in past, but she has to estimate the changing conditions,
which becomes more and more challenging the further in past. How about
the future? Even if the state of the world would not change, there is no
way in this framework to predict the demand at higher prices, toward which
the monopolist should be heading according to Hotelling [1931]. That is the
territory, of which there is no empirical knowledge. And that affects the
current decisions. The monopolist must form expectations. Every time the
expectations change the paths change. Let us hope that the monopolist is
not changing the expectations too often.
The governmental biofuel policies affect greatly the optimal production
and price paths. What kind of policy is declared and when it becomes ef-
fective affects the monopolist. The effect of different policies was discussed
throughout this thesis and I put that aside now, and assume that the mo-
nopolist assumes that the government is tightening the biofuel policy. For
simplicity assume that the date when the policy becomes affective is known,
but the level of the tightening is not. At that date, the value of the mo-
nopolist’s remaining oil stock will drop, because the more strict policy will
be applied. Therefore, she want to stick will the shorter oil stock the more
strict policy she expects. And to reach a lower stock, she will try to push
the more oil to the market now, the greater tightening she is afraid. That
could cause a green paradox. Even if the government did nothing, but gave
a reason for an anticipation.
The governmental policy anticipation is a powerful tool. The monopolist
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maximized her profit and considers the unproduced oil as an asset. The
uncertainty regarding the rules or policies could affect her to change the
current production. Also, the monopolist understands that all the policies
are not that quick to apply. Giving out a subsidy could be effective tomor-
row. On the other hand, forcing a minimum biofuel requirement needs a
long smoothening period, and it can be totally effective only in years’ time.
Anticipating the policy tools, how they are used and how they become fully
effective, are aspect the monopolist should consider every day. This kind of
uncertainty was not discussed more in this thesis.
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7 Conclusions
In this thesis I have discussed the biofuel from the mandatory proportional
biofuel requirement point of view. I set up the framework to analyze the
dynamics of the oil and biofuel production in time. I consider the framework
as my first merit. However, handling the dynamics I adopted mostly from
Hotelling [1931].
The basis of the framework was the discovery that the mandatory biofuel
requirement affects the residual oil demand in two ways. First, it affects the
oil quantity level, at which the minimum biofuel requirement breaks up.
Second, it affects also the oil demand at the higher oil quantities, because
the mandatory, minimum biofuel requirement answers to a part of the fuel
demand. Finding the ways the biofuel affects the demand I consider as my
second merit.
I studied the framework with two different cost structures. In the first one
the oil production cost structure was fixed in time and linear in production
quantities. In the second case the costs were dependent on the remaining
oil stock. Solving both of these cases independently I consider as the third
merit. I did not found any previous solution in case of the minimum biofuel
requirement. To illustrate the solutions I solved the cases also numerically.
Entering of a substitute affects the monopolist’s choices. The substitute
causes a mandatory price limiting phase. I solved the condition for the
length of the phase in two ways, using a direct derivation and also by using
a bounded optimal control, and consider that as my further merit.
As final words I would like to conclude that the minimum biofuel re-
quirement is at least in this context a very efficient environmental policy.
On the contrary to the subsidizing policy, which caused a Green Paradox at
least in some cases, the minimum biofuel requirement did not create a Green
Paradox in any of the studied cases.
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A Zero interest monopoly solution
To begin this more mathematical part of the thesis, I go back to the prin-
ciples. I will derive in this chapter the zero interest solution for the oil
monopolist. This means that the monopolist values the future’s earnings
as much as she values today’s earnings and hence no discounting needs to
be considered. Further, the monopolist does not take into account the yet
unproduced oil stock she owns. However, the biofuel is introduced into the
framework and the main contribution of the zero interest solution arrives
through understanding this dynamics.
There are deeper reasons in this than just to fill requirements of a com-
prehensive study. In fact, the basic monopolist’s results of the zero interest
case appear in the more advanced scenarios. It is like a measuring stick
against which the monopolist scales the quantities in those scenarios.
Also knowing that the derivations in the following chapters in appendix
might feel sometimes cumbersome, understanding the basic zero interest so-
lution might help in skipping some parts of the derivation if this reasoning
convince also in more mathematical cases.
A.1 Linear demands and supplies
I will use in most of the evaluations linear version for supplies and demands.
Here, (56a) gives the form of the inverse fuel demand, (56b) the inverse
biofuel supply and (56c) the fixed form of the marginal cost of oil. Further,
(56d) applies when the biofuel requirement is binding.
D−1fuel = α− βx (56a)
S−1bio = µ+ ηs (56b)
∂Coil
∂q
= γ + σq (56c)
x = (1 + a) q (56d)
A.2 Maximization in the zero interest model
The monopolist maximizes her profit. As there is no future to consider, the
profit is just the revenue reduced by the costs without discounting. Further,
as the monopolist operates on the oil market the revenue is the product of the
oil price and the oil quantity. The costs are her total costs. The optimization
problem is written down in (57a). Without discounting that is the problem,
which the monopolist faces every day. As was discussed in chapter 3, the
monopolist controls also the fuel markets in the given framework, and the
oil price is connected to the fuel price. In the optimization problem this is
taken into account in (57b), where the quantities are still oil quantities, but
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the prices arrive through the fuel and biofuel markets. Finally, in (57c) the
fuel price is replaced by the inverse demand in fuel market. I shall use this
version of the optimization problem to evaluate the optimal quantity for the
monopolist.
max
[
poilq −
(
γ +
1
2
σq
)
q − C (q)
]
(57a)
= max
[
(1 + a) qpfuel − aqpbio − γq − 1
2
σq2
]
(57b)
= max
[
(α− β (1 + a) q) (1 + a) q − a (µ+ ηaq) q − γq − 1
2
σq2
]
(57c)
A.3 Zero interest solution
Let me find next the profit maximizing quantity for the monopolist. That is
found in (58) simply by studying where the partial differential of the profit
in respect of the quantity vanishes. It is where the profit is in its maximum.
∂Π
∂q
= (1 + a)α− 2β (1 + a)2 q − aµ+ 2a2ηq − γ − σq = 0 (58)
Finally, given the optimal condition, the optimal quantity is
qˆ =
α (1 + a)− γ − aµ
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
=
(α− γ)− a (µ− α)
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
. (59)
B Marginal revenue at discontinuity
As the marginal revenue or profit has important role in the study, I will next
discuss that subject a bit further. The reason for that the marginal revenue
is important comes again from Hotelling’s rule for the monopolist.
B.1 Marginal revenue at the end of the first phase
I start from the residual inverse demand and study the initial phase, or when
the minimum biofuel requirement is binding. That is I take (56a) and (56d).
Now, fuel price when the minimum biofuel requirement is binding, is
pt = α− (1 + a)βqt. (60)
The discontinuity occurs when the prices of oil, fuel and biofuel meet. There-
fore the fuel price is equal to the oil price at discontinuity, and it is
p1 = α− (1 + a)βq1
= α− (1 + a)β (α− µ)
β (1 + a) + aη
(61)
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Here I have used the quantity q1 at the discontinuity, which can be evaluated
by setting the fuel and biofuel prices equal and holding the minimum biofuel
requirement binding, in (56a) and (56b). It is
q1 =
(α− µ)
β (1 + a) + aη
. (62)
The reason of this part of analysis was to understand, how the the marginal
profit at the end of the initial phase behaves. To proceed in that let me write
the marginal profit explicitly down and evaluate it at the discontinuity with
the help of (60),
pi1 =
∂pq
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
q1
= p1 + q1
∂p
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
q1
= p1 − (1 + a)βq1. (63)
The marginal revenue depends on the price and quantity at the discontinuity,
and also directly on the biofuel requirement. They all are affected when
the biofuel requirement is changed. Next, I write down the change in the
marginal revenue when changing the biofuel requirement,
∂pi1
∂a
=
∂p1
∂a
− βq1 − (1 + a)β∂q1
∂a
. (64)
Using (61) and (62) the effect of changing biofuel requirement on the price
p1 and the quantity q1 at discontinuity are
∂p1
∂a
= − [β (1 + a) + aη] (α− µ)− (1 + a) (α− µ) (β + η)
[β (1 + a) + aη]2
(65a)
∂q1
∂a
= − (β + η) (α− µ)
[β (1 + a) + aη]2
. (65b)
Putting these together and eliminating few term reveals the change in the
marginal revenue pi1, and it is
∂pi1
∂a
=
η (α− µ) (1 + β)
[β (1 + a) + aη]2
. (66)
B.2 The price limiting phase’s length
The length of the price limiting phase depends on the ratio of the marginal
revenues at discontinuity as was discussed for example in chapter 4.2.1. In
order to understand how the price limiting phase’s length changes when
changing the minimum biofuel requirement, I have to understand how the
ratio of the marginal revenues behaves in that change. Let me first write
down the ratio of the marginal revenues, and spell it out
pi2
pi1
∣∣∣
q1
=
p1 + q1
∂p2
∂q |q1
p1 + q1
∂p1
∂q |q1
=
p1 − d2q1
p1 − (1 + a)βq1 . (67)
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Here I have used (61) for the first phase marginal revenue, where the min-
imum biofuel requirement is binding. Further, the case when the minimum
requirement is broken in smaller quantities than q1 was discussed already
in chapter 3.5.1. Now, I have used d2 as the slope of the residual inverse
demand for that case. It is constant and especially independent of the min-
imum biofuel requirement, and explicitly
d2 =
p¯− p1
q1
=
βη
β + η
. (68)
Let me now go to the actual question, how the change of the biofuel require-
ment affects the ratio of the marginal revenues. I write down the change,
∂
∂a
pi2
pi1
∣∣∣
q1
=
(
∂pi2
∂a
− pi2
pi1
∂pi1
∂a
)
1
pi1
. (69)
In this only the change of pi2 is unknown. It can be solved in similar manner
that it was solved for pi1. It is
∂pi2
∂a
=
∂p1
∂a
− d2∂q1
∂a
=
(1 + β) (α− µ) η
[β (1 + a) + aη]2
(70)
Compare this with (66) to find that ∂pi2∂a =
∂pi2
∂a . Now, it is a simple task to
finalize the evaluation and get
pi1
∂
∂a
pi2
pi1
∣∣∣
q1
=
(1 + β) (α− µ) η
[β (1 + a) + aη]2
(
1− pi2
pi1
)
< 0. (71)
Hence, the ratio of the marginal revenues decreases when the biofuel require-
ment is increased. As the length is related to the logarithm of the ratio, also
the length of the price limiting second period decreases.
C Static costs with no backstop
C.1 Quantity and price paths
Let us go back to the optimization problem. As the monopolist is primarily
interest in her oil, let us plug in the oil quantities and proper supply, de-
mand and cost functions. She takes into account the future, understands
the difference of profit at different time instants and also that her oil stock
is limited.
Starting again from the monopolist who maximizes profit. I may add a
constant to the problem as explained in 2.4,
max
[
[(α− β (1 + a) q) (1 + a) q − Coil (q)− aqpbio (aq)] e−rt − λq
]
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For this function, the first order condition (at each time instant t) is[
α (1 + a)− 2β (1 + a)2 q − (γ + σq)− a (µ+ 2ηaq)
]
e−rt − λ = 0.
Further, the quantity path can be solved from that. Note that the equation
contains still the Lagrange multiplier.
q =
α (1 + a)− γ − aµ− λert
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
In order to get rid of the Lagrange multiplier I introduce a further condition.
I require that the production is finished when the time of exhaustion (let me
use notation T for the time of exhaustion). From this condition the Lagrange
multiplier can be solved
λ = (α (1 + a)− γ − aµ− λ) e−rT .
Before taking the final steps towards solving the price and quantity paths
let us study this result as we incorporated into the Lagrange multiplier some
economical meaning. The Lagrange multiplier or in situ value is a present
value measure of the marginal profits on the optimal path – the profit of
selling the last unit of fuel at any time instant. Further, I stressed already
previously that the solutions are valid throughout the optimal quantity and
price paths. Finally, using the value of the Lagrange multiplier the oil quan-
tity and price paths as functions of time are
q (t) =
(α (1 + a)− γ − aµ) (1− e−r(T−t))
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
= qˆ
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
(72)
p (t) = α (1 + a)− aµ−
(
β (1 + a)2 + a2η
) (α (1 + a)− γ − aµ) (1− e−r(T−t))
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
= p¯+ qˆ
(
β (1 + a)2 + a2η
)(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
(73)
C.2 Exhaustion time
There is a further requirement related to the stock. The whole stock shall
be exhausted as there is nothing to stop the profitable oil production. The
stock is just the sum of all production. Using the linear forms that is
S0 =
∫ T
0
q (t) dt
=
∫ T
0
(α (1 + a)− γ − aµ) (1− e−r(T−t))
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
dt
=
α (1 + a)− γ − aµ
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
T − 1
r
(α (1 + a)− γ − aµ) (1− e−r(T−t))
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
.
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Now, using the zero interest solution given in (59) this reduces to
1
r
(
1− e−rT ) = −S0
qˆ
+ T. (74)
The exhaustion time is on both sides of the equation, and it is not analytically
solvable. There is however always one single solution.
C.3 Biofuel affecting exhaustion time
The exhaustion time depends on the biofuel requirement. In (74) there was
only one other coefficient namely the one step monopoly solution, qˆ that
depends on the biofuel requirement. Hence, to see the effect of the biofuel
more clearly, let me write first the effect of the one step monopoly solution
on the exhaustion time
dT
dqˆ
=
−S0
qˆ (1− e−rT ) < 0. (75)
Increasing zero interest monopoly solution decreases the exhaustion time.
Now, the change in the biofuel requirement affects the zero interest monopoly
solution. Remembering that in linear no-backstop case α < µ, I obtain
dqˆ
da
=
−1
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + a2η
(
(µ− α) + β (1 + a) + 2aη
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + a2η
)
< 0. (76)
Combining (75) and (76)
dT
da
=
∂T
∂qˆ
dqˆ
da
> 0 (77)
Hence, increasing the minimum biofuel requirement increases the exhaustion
time.
D Biofuel as backstop in static costs
Consider that there was no oil in the market. The biofuel producers would
respond to that by fulfilling the whole fuel demand, if capable. The monop-
olist knows this and realizes the price cap that limits her actions, namely
the competitive biofuel price. This is called the choke price.
In fact there is another important price limit. As we saw earlier in case of
expensive biofuel analysis, the produced oil and biofuel quantities decreased
over time. At the same time the oil and fuel prices increased, but the biofuel
price decreased. Now, if biofuel can act as a backstop, at some point the
prices of oil, fuel and biofuel meet. This point is the smallest quantity when
the biofuel requirement would still be binding. Biofuel would be provided
to the fuel market according to the minimum requirement at that price level
even without it. It turns out that the monopolist wants to stay at that price
and quantity level for a while.
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D.1 Quantity and price paths
Let me consider here of the monopolist’s reaction to the backstop biofuel
when there is a minimum biofuel requirement. First, there is the competition
that limits the pricing when the fuel quantities are smaller than q1, because
there the competitive biofuel will eat up increasing portion of the demand.
When the oil monopolist limits her production below q1, distributors may
add more biofuel to fuel than the minimum requirement. Second, at higher
quantities part of the demand is responded automatically by biofuel due to
the minimum biofuel requirement.
It is no surprise that at the point of exhaustion the monopolist has pro-
duced all of her stock. Production would be still profitable to produce left-
over stock due to low marginal costs if some of it would be left. Therefore,
monopolist does not leave anything into the ground.
I will derive next the optimal oil quantity and price paths for the monop-
olist and use the calculus of variations as my tool. The calculus of variations
bases on the Euler–Lagrange equation, in (78). The optimum path must sat-
isfy the equation at any time instant, but at discontinuities. Solution of the
Euler–Lagrange equation applies therefore at any time instant, but when the
quantity is q1, which shall be discussed separately. Now, the Euler–Lagrange
equation is
∂f
∂S
− d
dt
∂f
∂S˙
=
∂f
∂S
+
d
dt
∂f
∂q
= 0. (78)
In these static cost cases I have assumed that none of the factors in the
optimization problem depends on the oil stock, and there are no other stocks
of any kind available. Therefore, the Euler–Lagrange equation reduces to
d
dt
∂f
∂q
= 0. (79)
The optimization problem that the monopolist faces is that of maximizing
the discounted profits, when she may choose the oil quantities. With linear
function forms it is formally
max
∫ T
0
fdt (80)
f =
[
(α− β (1 + a) q) (1 + a) q −
(
γ +
1
2
σq
)
q − a (µ+ ηaq) q
]
e−rt.
Now, before going to the Euler–Lagrange equation, let me write down the
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partial derivative of f and its time derivative,
∂f
∂q
=
[
α (1 + a)− 2β (1 + a)2 q − (γ + σq)− a (µ+ 2ηaq)
]
e−rt (81)
ert
d
dt
∂f
∂q
= −2β (1 + a)2 q˙ − σq˙ − 2a2ηq˙
− r
[
α (1 + a)− 2β (1 + a)2 q − (γ + σq)− a (µ+ 2ηaq)
]
= 0.
(82)
Equation 82 is the Euler–Lagrange equation for this case.Its characteristics
are easier to analyze, when it is organized in a typical form of a first order
differential equation,
q˙ − rq + r α (1 + a)− γ − aµ
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
= 0. (83)
First step in solving this differential equation is to find the special, static
solution. It is found by assuming that the quantity has found a static state,
and hence its time derivative vanishes or q˙ = 0. The special, static solution
in (84) is in fact the zero interest monopoly quantity
qstatic = qˆ =
α (1 + a)− γ − aµ
2β (1 + a)2 + σ + 2a2η
. (84)
The next step in solving the Euler–Lagrange equation is to find the general
solution for the homogeneous equation 85, where the constant has been left
out as the static solution shall fulfill that,
q˙ − rq = 0. (85)
This homogeneous equation has solution (86a), and the general solution in
(86b) is the sum of the specific and homogeneous solutions.
q = Gert (86a)
q = Gert + qˆ (86b)
To finalize the analysis, let me include the constraints. As there shall be two
different phases, initial and final, where this same solution applies, I write
this quite formally down. At the end, the oil quantity is q (T ) = qT . From
that the constant G is
G = (qT − qˆ) e−rT (87)
Finally, including the previous results the solution for quantity path is
q (t) = (qT − qˆ) e−r(T−t) + qˆ. (88)
In case this is applied to the initial phase, where the minimum biofuel re-
quirement is binding, the final quantity is q1. On the other hand, if applied
to the final period, the quantity vanishes at the end. Naturally, it has its
own zero interest monopoly solution.
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D.2 Exhaustion time
There is still the exhaustion time to solve. First, the monopolist shall pro-
duce again all of her oil stock (reserved for the particular phase), as oil
production is profitable till the end and would be even further on. There-
fore, the whole production shall sum up to the whole oil stock. Now, for the
initial or final phase the produced stock during it is
Si =
∫ T
0
q (t) dt
=
∫ T
0
(
(qT − qˆ) e−r(T−t) + qˆ
)
dt
= qˆT +
1
r
(qT − qˆ)
(
1− e−rT )
From this the equation the exhaustion time is
1
r
(
1− e−rT ) = − Si
qˆ − qT +
qˆ
qˆ − qT T, (89)
where qT = q1 in the initial phase, and qT = 0 in the final phase.
E Case of fixed biofuel quantity in static costs
Previously I have discussed cases where the government has dictated a min-
imum proportional biofuel requirement. There is however a difficulty with
the solutions related to those cases. The problem is that also the biofuel
quantity decreases over the time when the biofuel requirement is binding.
This is because as the oil monopolist has the market power, she optimizes
her profits over time by reducing the oil quantity bit by bit and the biofuel
production is binded to that quantity.
Decreasing biofuel quantity might be acceptable if that would lead to a
stable solution, where the biofuel market would rest in an equilibrium. In
case of very expensive biofuel this was the case. However, that biofuel market
equilibrium would mean zero biofuel production. In case of the backstop
biofuel the solution is much more cumbersome. In that case the biofuel
production decreases as the oil production decreases, and after reaching a
certain oil production level q1 biofuel production stands still at constant
production for a while and then increases gradually to the competitive biofuel
level. At the same time oil vanishes altogether from fuel market.
Allowing the biofuel quantity to go first down and then up is not a solid
governmental strategy. Therefore, I study here a very stable strategy in
which the biofuel production is fixed to the competitive level, in which it
would settle if no oil would be on the market anymore.
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E.1 Quantity and price paths
To start with I evaluate the biofuel quantity level by setting the biofuel
supply and fuel demand equal (see appendix A.1). The biofuel quantity
level is
ss =
α− µ
β + η
.
As before the fuel price is the weighted average of oil and biofuel prices,
pfuel =
s
x
pbio +
q
x
poil. (90)
However, as the biofuel quantity is fixed there is not anymore a simple pro-
portional dependence between oil and biofuel. Plugging in the required bio-
fuel quantity level, the revenue from oil to the monopolist is
qpoil = (q + ss) pfuel − sspbio.
Again, monopolist maximized discounted profits, revenue minus costs∫ T
0
[qpoil − C (q)] e−rtdt
=
∫ T
0
[
(α− β (q + ss)) (q + ss)− sspbio −
(
γ +
1
2
σq
)
q
]
e−rtdt. (91)
Proceeding here follows the same path as in earlier cases. I want to solve
the Euler–Lagrange equation, and need the integrand’s partial derivative in
respect of the qunatity,
∂f
∂q
= (α− 2β (q + ss)− γ − σq) e−rt.
The integrand of the optimization problem has no dependence on the stock
and therefore, the Euler–Lagrange equation can be directly written down,
ert
d
dt
∂F
∂q
= (−2β − σ) q˙ − r (α− γ − 2β (q + ss)− σq) = 0. (92)
To solve the equation, I write that in a typical differential equation form
q˙ − rq + rα− γ − 2βss
2β + σ
= 0. (93)
Euler equation’s special, static solution is found, when its dynamics is re-
moved. The static, special solution qs is
qs =
α− γ − 2βss
2β + σ
. (94)
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The next step is to find solution for the homogeneous equation, out of which
the static solution is removed. The homogeneous equation is
q˙ − rq = 0. (95)
This simple homogeneous equation has a familiar solution,
q = Hert. (96)
Now, combining the special solution from (94) and the solution of the homo-
geneous equation in (96) I get the the general solution for the Euler–Lagrange
equation,
q = Hert + qs. (97)
For finalizing the solution I need to consider the constraints. I require that
the monopolist finalizes her oil production at the highest possible price level,
at the backstop price. And hence, the final quantity reaches zero, and
q (T ) = HerT + qs = 0 (98a)
H = −qse−rT . (98b)
Including this into the general solution in (97), the quantity path finally is
q = qs
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
. (99)
E.2 Exhaustion time
Again, all of the oil stock shall be used as it is profitable to produce it till
the end of the production. Let me therefore integrate the quantity path over
the whole time period till the exhaustion time,
S0 =
∫ T
0
q (t) dt
=
∫ T
0
qs
(
1− e−r(T−t)
)
dt
= qsT +
qs
r
(
1− e−rT ) .
Modifying that still, in (100) the condition for the exhaustion time is pre-
sented in a bit clearer way.
−S0
qs
+ T =
1
r
(
1− e−rT ) (100)
The condition is of the familiar form that has been popping up in all of the
cases presented till. For example, comparing that to the no backstop case
in (74) or to the final phase in the backstop case, the only difference is the
quantity measure that is here qs and qˆ in the previous cases.
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F Derivations in dynamic oil costs
Contrary to the previous static oil supply cases, I shall now discuss and
derive quantity paths for a case in which the costs of oil are dynamic. One
might consider that the dynamic oil costs would be more realistic, and that
it would fit the world’s oil production better than the static models.
F.1 Stock dynamics
The starting point of the analysis is again the optimization problem of the oil
monopolist. That problem is the same as previously in the static oil supply
cases, but now the oil costs depend on the stock. I will solve the case first
partially. That is for a part of the case in which there are no discontinuities
in the demand, costs, marginal marginal cost or marginal demand. Later on
I will clue the needed parts together.
I will derive the dynamics for the initial phase, but same dynamics apply
to the final phase also just the coefficients change. The optimization problem
for the initial phase is
max
∫ T
0
[(α− β (1 + a) q) (1 + a) q − (γ + δ (S0 − S (t)))− aqpbio (aq)] e−rt.
(101)
The formal analysis follows similarly as the ones discussed when the oil
supply was static and starts with the Euler–Lagrange equation. Hence, let
me write down the partial derivative of the integrand f in respect of the
stock and the quantity, and the time derivative of the latter,
∂F
∂S
= δqe−rt
∂F
∂q
=
(
(1 + a)α− 2β (1 + a)2 q − (γ + δ (S0 − S (t)))− a (µ+ 2ηaq)
)
e−rt
ert
d
dt
∂F
∂q
= −2β (1 + a)2 q˙ − δq − 2ηa2q˙
− r
(
(1 + a)α− 2β (1 + a)2 q − (γ + δ (S0 − S (t)))− a (µ+ 2ηaq)
)
.
Here the analysis start to differ from the previous cases, because now the
partial derivative in respect of the stock does not vanish. Now, the Euler–
Lagrange equation is in this case
(
∂F
∂S
+
d
dt
∂F
∂q
)
ert = δq − 2β (1 + a)2 q˙ − δq − 2ηa2q˙ − r (1 + a)α
+ 2rβ (1 + a)2 q + r (γ (S0 − S (t))) + ar (µ+ 2ηaq) = 0 (102)
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This can be modified to a typical differential equation form
S¨−rS˙− rδ
2β (1 + a)2 + 2a2η
S =
r
2β (1 + a)2 + 2a2η
((1 + a)α− γ − aµ− δS0) .
(103)
This is the second order differential equation of the oil stock. That and
conditions at the starting and ending points are all I need in solving the
equation. The first step in solving is to find the special solution. This
steady state specific solution can be solved by finding a solution where all
dynamics is removed by setting S˙ and S¨ as zero. Hence, this static, specific
solution carries also the right hand side’s constant, and it is
Ss = S0 − 1
δ
((1 + a)α− γ − aµ) . (104)
The remainder of the equation is called homogeneous equation. The second
step in solving is to find the solution for the homogeneous equation. Let me
write down the homogeneous equation and to simplify the following steps
introduce a constant c,
S¨ − rS˙ − cS = 0, where
c =
rδ
2β (1 + a)2 + 2a2η
.
Solving the homogeneous second order differential equation starts with writ-
ing down the characteristic equation. I denote the roots of the characteristic
equation by w. Hence, let me try out introducing S = ewt, and derive its
characteristic equation
w2 − rw − c = 0.
There are two real roots, out of which one is positive and the second negative
w1 =
r +
√
r2 + 4c
2
=
r
2
+
√(r
2
)2
+
rδ
2β (1 + a)2 + 2a2η
> 0 (105)
w2 =
r −√r2 + 4c
2
=
r
2
−
√(r
2
)2
+
rδ
2β (1 + a)2 + 2a2η
< 0. (106)
Hence, putting together results in the solution for the oil stock is the sum of
the general solution and the specific solution.
S (t) = C1e
w1t + C2e
w2t + Ss (107)
It remains to define the constants involved using the conditions.
Same solution applies to the final phase. In that the coefficient has just
a different value, c = rδ2d2 . Here, d2 is the slope of the residual demand
function. Note that not the coefficient nor the roots are dependent on the
minimum biofuel requirement in the final phase.
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F.2 Coefficients in initial phase
When considering the solution for the oil stock in (107), the first instinct
might be to turn against the constraint of the exponential function with the
positive root. There are no economical or technical reasons why the stock
would increase at any point – no one is pumping oil back to the well! Hence,
why would there be any such term in the oil stock time path that increases
with time. And further, the absolute value of w1 is greater than that of w2
or |w1| > |w2|. Therefore, without a heavy weight on C2 compared to C1,
it is the positive root w1 term that affect the stock’s time path the most.
Nevertheless, I keep both terms still with me, and try not to jump into
conclusions.
To fully solve the time path of the oil stock and define the coefficient
and the exhaustion time T, I have to use the three conditions or constraints,
because there are three unknown parameters: C1, C2 and T . The first of the
constraints defines the amount of the original stock. The second constraint
is the requirement that at the end of the phase the quantity must be q1.
The final constraint is the final stock. That arrives through the optimality
requirements for the last two phases. In those, specific amounts of stock
shall be produced leaving a defined stock for the final phase.
Conditions
1. The stock in the beginning is S0.
S (0) = S0 = C1e
w10 + C2e
w20 + Ss = C1 + C2 + Ss
= C1 + C2 + S0 − 1
δ
((1 + a)α− γ − aµ) (108)
From this I get the first equation for the constants
C1 + C2 =
1
δ
((1 + a)α− γ − aµ) . (109)
2. The final quantity shall be q1. This gives the second equation
q(T ) = q1 = C1w1e
w1T + C2w2e
w2T . (110)
3. The final stock is S(t1. I do not want to fix the length of the period,
but the final stock defines that. The final equation is
S(T ) = S (t1) = C1e
w1T + C2e
w2T + Ss. (111)
F.3 Coefficients in final phase
Let me now go to the final phase’s solution. In that the quantity vanishes
in the end. This is the first condition. The production lasts either till there
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is nothing left or till it turn to unprofitable. In the first case oil is physically
exhausted and in the latter case it is economically exhausted. In both cases
that defines the stock at the exhaustion. Finally, let me assume that there
is such a great stock of oil that the last phase is not enough for the whole
production path. In that case also the initial quantity is given. It is q1, and
that is the last condition.
Conditions
1. The stock in the end is ST . From this, the first equation for the
constants is
S (T ) = ST = C1e
w1T + C2e
w2T + Ss. (112)
2. The quantity shall vanish in the end, q (T ) = 0. The second equation
is
q (T ) = C1w1e
w1T + C2w2e
w2T = 0 (113a)
C1 = −C2w2
w1
e(w2−w1)T . (113b)
3. The quantity in the beginning of the phase is q1. Hence, the third
equation is
q (0) = C1w1e
w10 + C2w2e
w20 = q1 (114a)
C1w1 + C2w2 = q1. (114b)
I write explicitly down the resulting equations for solving the constants
as there are two possible out comes; an economical or a physical exhaustion,
ST − Ss
q1
=
e(w1+w2)T
ew1T − ew2T
[
1
w1
− 1
w2
]
(115a)
C1 =
q1e
w2T
w1 (ew1T − ew2T ) (115b)
C2 = − q1e
w1T
w2 (ew1T − ew2T ) (115c)
These can be solved starting from the first. There is an important econom-
ical difference related to the exhaustion. In case of physical exhaustion the
final stock, ST vanishes. In that case there is a finite solution for the ex-
haustion time. Nevertheless, in case of an economically exhausting oil the
stock reaches its static solution, or ST = Ss. This causes an infinite long
exhaustion time.
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F.4 Marginal profit dynamics in price limiting
F.4.1 Direct derivation
To evaluate the length of the second, price limiting phase I shall use optimal
control theory. I have to stretch it in places, but claim that the final solution
fulfills the requirements. In next chapter, F.4.2 I will go the same derivation
using there the bounded optimal control theory and gain same result.
I know already the marginal revenue in the beginning and at the end of
the price limiting phase. Also the stock dynamics during the phase is trivial
as the quantity is constant. Now, the Hamiltonian and dynamic equation of
the marginal profit for the price limiting phase are
H =
(
p†q + δSq
)
− λtq (116a)
∂p†q
∂q
+ δS − λt = 0 (116b)
λ˙t = rλ− δq. (116c)
Here, λ meets the marginal profit in the beginning and at the end of the
price limiting phase. And that is what I want to solve. Here I must be
careful as the marginal revenue is not defined well between the beginning
and at the end of the price limiting phase. In those end points I require that
marginal profits are continuous and equal to their counterparts at the end of
the initial and at the beginning of the final phases. The value of the actual
marginal profit is not important during the price limiting phase and I give
it there the value of λ. I use λ just to mediate the value between the time
instants.
Let me write (116c) a bit differently
d
(
λte
−rt)
dt
= −δq1e−rt. (117)
In this form both sides of the equations are simple to integrate, giving∫ t2
0
d
(
λte
−rt) = −δq1 ∫ t2
0
e−rtdt, (118a)
λt2e
−rt2 − λt1 = −
δ
r
q1
(
1− e−rt?2
)
. (118b)
This is the condition for the marginal profit over the second phase. To get the
condition for the length of the period, I will use (118b), require continuous
marginal profits over the phase transitions and obtain
pi†1 + δS (t1)−
δ
r
q1 = e
−rt?2
(
pi†2 + δS (t2)−
δ
r
q1
)
(119a)
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e−rt
?
2 =
pi†1 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
)
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) + δq1
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) t?2. (119b)
This is the rule for the second period, and here
pi†1 = pi1 − γ − δS0 (120a)
pi†2 = pi2 − γ − δS0. (120b)
In the rule for the price limiting period length, I have changed the notation
and t?2 marks the length of the price limiting phase and t2 the final time
instant of that period. I have also set in the stock at the end of the period,
as that is fixed due to the final phase optimality requirement. That given,
the length of the price limiting phase is now explicitly on both sides of the
equation. On the left side it is in the discount factor, but it is also in the right
hand side’s linear function of the form k1+k2t2. The coefficients k1 and k2 of
the linear right hand side are constants, when the residual demand and the
minimum biofuel requirement are given. They are determined at the phase
change taking into account of the discontinuity of the marginal revenue.
Now, taking into account that pi2 + δ
(
S(t2)− q1r
)
> pi1 + δ
(
S(t2)− q1r
)
there is a important relation between the the coefficient k1 and k2. If the
first coefficient, k1 is less than one, the second coefficient is positive, and vice
versa. The equation has therefore in any case exactly one solution.
I did not discuss here at all if second phase is in monopolist plan, and
for example if it is profitable phase. And on purpose I left the conditions
for the profitability out of this analysis. All I need to carry out out from
this is that if the monopolist has decided to operate in the steeper part of
oil’s residual demand function, she faces the price limiting phase. And that
phase is always of a finite length.
F.4.2 Optimal control with a bounded quantity
I will give here also a second approach to this case with the help of bounded
optimal control theory. For reference see for example Kamien and Schwartz
[1991].
In the first phase the quantity path is in fact bounded. There the mini-
mum biofuel requirement is binding and that occurs only, when the produced
oil quantity is greater than q1. Without taking this explicitly into account
the quantity path satisfying the boundary condition would in cases get val-
ues lower than q1. Therefore, I take this limitation into account. However,
as I have already solved the form of the solution with the help of Euler –
Lagrange equation all I need from this are the values of the coefficients.
I write down the optimization problem in case of the bound,
max
∫
fdt (121a)
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S˙ = −q, S (0) = S0, q ≥ q1 (121b)
f =
(
P †i q + δSq
)
e−rt (121c)
P †i = b
i
1 − bi2q (121d)
bi1 = α (1 + a)− γ − aµ− δS0 (121e)
bi2 = β (1 + a)
2 + ηa2 (121f)
The Hamiltonian and Lagrangian are then
H = f − λq (122a)
L = f − λq + z (q − q1) . (122b)
In the Lagrangian there is the bound explicitly written down and the variable
z ensures that the bound is respected. The conditions are
∂L
∂q
=
∂f
∂q
− λ+ z = 0 (123a)
z (q − q1) = 0, z ≥ 0 (123b)
λ˙ = −∂H
∂S
= −δqe−rt (123c)
The quantity path is decreasing as was already discussed by Hotelling [1931].
Therefore, if the quantity ever reached the bound, the quantity remains at
the bound till the end of the period. The period ends at the stock level S2,
which was defined as the optimal for the last period.
I need still one condition, because in this case the time instant when the
quantity path reaches the bound q1 is not given. Especially that time instant
can not be evaluated using the initial stock at the beginning of the final phase
– resulting quantity path would not respect the bound. Therefore, I use the
transversality condition for the free final time instant according to results in
part II, chapter 6 in Kamien and Schwartz [1991] and mark this final time as
t1. The condition states how the salvage values has to be taken into account.
Applying that to the present case, the condition at the final time, when the
quantity path reaches q1 is
f − λq − rΠ (t1)− re−rt?2Π2 (t2) = 0
∣∣∣
t=t1
. (124)
Here, the second last and the last term are the time derivative of the salvage
value of the remaining production till the start of the final phase, and from
that till the exhaustion, respectively. The value of the price limiting phase
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is Π1 (t1) and delaying of that production infinitesimally costs rΠ (t1) as an
uncollected rent. Here,
Π1 (t1) =
∫ t2
0
[
p†1q + δqS
]
e−rt
=
q1
r
(
p†1 + δS1 −
δq1
r
)(
1− e−rt?2
)
+
δq21
r
t2e
−rt?2 , (125)
where p†1 = p1 − γ − δS0. Now, let me evaluate the last phase profit. It is
Π2 (t2) =
∫ T
0
[
P †f + δS
]
qe−rtdt
= −1
r
[(
P †f + δS
)
qe−rt
] ∣∣∣T
0
+
1
r
∫ T
0
[
q˙
(
pi†f + δS
)
− δq2
]
e−rtdt
=
1
r
(
p†1 + δS (t2)
)
q1 +
1
r
[
q
(
pi†f + δS
)
qe−rt
] ∣∣∣T
0
− 1
r
∫ T
0
d
dt
(
pi†f + δS
)
qe−rtdt− 1
r
∫ T
0
δq2e−rtdt
=
1
r
(
p†1 − pi†2
)
q1 (126)
Here the integration by parts has been applied twice in the second and third
phases. And the second last line I used a trick, and the two integrals vanish
because those state the integral of the time path of λ, see (123c) and (123a)
and apply those to the final phase. Hence, the integrand itself vanishes at
every time instant on that path.
The variable z is nonzero only when the quantity path has reached the
bound, q1. Therefore, when arriving to the bound, z is zero. Taking that
into account at t1 and using 123a and 124, I get
f − q∂f
∂q
− rΠ1 (t1)− re−rt2Π2 (t2) = 0
∣∣∣
t=t1
. (127)
To proceed, note also that by using 121c
f − q∂f
∂q
∣∣∣
t=t1
= −q21
∂P †i
∂q
∣∣∣
t=t1
. (128)
Plugging that and both 125 and 126 into 127 I get
q1
∂P †i
∂q
+
(
p†1 + δS1 −
δq1
r
)(
1− e−rt?2
)
+ δq1t
?
2e
−rt?2 +
(
p†1 − pi†2
)
e−rt
?
2 = 0.
(129)
Remembering that pi†1 =
∂(P †i q)
∂q |t1 and removing counter balancing terms this
evolves to
pi†1 + δS (t1)−
δ
r
q1 =
(
pi†2 + δS2 −
δ
r
q1
)
e−rt
?
2 (130)
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Finally, as I want to write this in terms of the solvable S (t2) and after
reorganization the condition reads
e−rt
?
2 =
pi†1 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
)
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) + δq1
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
) t?2 (131)
The condition is the same derived in the previous chapter.
F.5 Total profit
In previous chapter I already evaluated the profits for the last two phases. I
continue from there and evaluate now the total profit in net present value.
Only missing part for the total profit is the profit of the initial phase.
That is
Π0 =
∫ t1
0
[
P †i + δS
]
qe−rtdt
= −1
r
[
P †i + δS
]
qe−rt
∣∣∣t1
0
+
1
r
[
pi†i + δS
]
qe−rt
∣∣∣t1
0
=
1
r
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
q0 − 1
r
(
p†1 − pi†1
)
q1e
−rt1 (132)
Here I used (126) in the second line to get rid of unnecessary terms.
The total profit is just the sum of the phase’s profit at present value.
Using (125), (126) and (132) I get
Π = Π0 + Π1e
−rt1 + Π2e−r(t1+t
?
2)
=
q1e
−rt1
r
[
pi†1 + δS (t1)−
δq1
r
−
(
pi2 + S (t2)− δq1
r
)
e−rt
?
2
]
+
1
r
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
q0
=
1
r
(
p†0 − pi†0
)
q0. (133)
To reach the final result, I used (130).
The total profit is just the same as it was in the static cost case. It
depends on the initial quantity, price and marginal revenue as well as the
required interest rate.
F.6 Hotelling’s rule and changing biofuel requirement
In linear demand the marginal revenue is a simple function of the produced
quantity. For the initial phase it is
pi(q) = pi1 − 2d2(q − q1), (134)
where d2 = β (1 + a)2+a2η in this case, and the slope of the residual demand
in general.
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From the Hamiltonian and its optimal conditions, I get the conditions
for the marginal profit, λ. They similar to those in (116), and
rλ = λ˙+ δq =
d
dt
(λ− δS)
=
d
dt
pi† =
∂pi†
∂q
dq
dt
= −2d2q˙. (135)
This is condition for the marginal profit in the linear demand with dynamic
costs. I differentiate that in respect of the minimum biofuel requirement and
solve the change in q˙,
∂q˙
∂a
= − r
2d2
∂λ
∂a
− q˙
d2
∂d2
∂a
> 0. (136)
The quantity decreases at a lower pace in the start. The result follows from
the facts that the slope becomes steeper and the initial marginal revenue
decreases in increasing biofue requirement. The latter fact arrives as the
initial costs are the same, and in order to produce the same stock with the
decreased demand, the monopolist has to produce a longer period and to
start with lower marginal revenue.
F.7 Changing biofuel requirement
To proceed the analysis of the changing biofuel requirement, few step are
needed. I will show that the sign of pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1r
)
is negative and also
that it is increasing with increasing biofuel requirement. By direct evaluation
is get
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1
r
)
= pi2 + δSs − δq1
w2
− δq1
r
− γ − δS0
= p¯† − 2d2q1 + δSs − δq1
w2
− δq1
r
= p¯† + δSs − q1
(
δ
r
+ 2d2 +
δ
w2
)
= −λ (t1)− λ (t2)
1− e−rt?2 < 0. (137)
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Here in the last line I used another result, namely
δ
r
+ 2d2 +
δ
w2
=
δ
r
+ 2
p¯− p1
q1
+
δ
w2
=
1
q1
(
δq1
(
1
r
+
1
w2
)
+ p¯† − pi†2
)
=
1
q1
(
δq1
r
+ δSs − δS (t2) + p¯† − pi†2
)
=
1
q1
(
λ (t1)− λ (t2) e−rt?2
1− e−rt?2 + δSs + p¯
† − λ (t2)
)
=
1
q1
(
λ (t1)− λ (t2)
1− e−rt?2 + δSs + p¯
†
)
> 0. (138)
This result is useful also in evaluating the changing biofuel requirement,
where direct derivation gives
∂
∂a
[
pi†2 + δ
(
S (t2)− q1
r
)]
=
∂pi†2
∂a
+ δ
∂S (t2)
∂a
− δ
r
∂q1
∂a
= −
(
δ
r
+ 2d2 +
δ
w2
)
∂q1
∂a
> 0. (139)
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